Clinton v. City of New York
524 U.S. 417, 118 S.Ct. 2091, 141 L.Ed.2d 393 (1998)
Rule of Law:
The Line Item Veto Act is unconstitutional because it authorizes the President to unilaterally amend or repeal parts of duly enacted statutes, thereby violating the bicameralism and presentment procedures mandated by Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution.
Facts:
- In 1997, Congress passed the Balanced Budget Act, which included a provision, § 4722(c), relieving the State of New York from a potential multi-billion dollar liability to the federal government under the Medicaid program.
- Congress also passed the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, which included a provision, § 968, allowing sellers of certain food processing facilities to defer capital gains taxes if they sold their stock to an eligible farmers' cooperative.
- The Snake River Potato Growers, a farmers' cooperative, was formed with the intent of acquiring a processing facility and was engaged in negotiations to do so, relying on the tax benefit provided by § 968.
- After signing both acts into law, President Bill Clinton exercised his authority under the Line Item Veto Act to 'cancel' § 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act and § 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act.
- The President's cancellation of § 4722(c) reinstated New York's contingent liability, directly affecting the City of New York and several health care providers.
- The cancellation of § 968 eliminated the tax deferral benefit, causing the negotiations between Snake River Potato Growers and the owner of a processing facility to terminate.
Procedural Posture:
- The City of New York and other health care providers filed a lawsuit against the President in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the cancellation of a provision in the Balanced Budget Act.
- Snake River Potato Growers, Inc. and an individual farmer filed a separate lawsuit in the same court challenging the cancellation of a provision in the Taxpayer Relief Act.
- The U.S. District Court consolidated the two cases.
- The District Court found that at least one plaintiff in each case had standing and held that the Line Item Veto Act was unconstitutional.
- The U.S. government, as the appellant, filed a direct and expedited appeal of the District Court's decision to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does the Line Item Veto Act, which grants the President the authority to cancel specific provisions of a duly enacted law, violate the Presentment Clause of Article I, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
Yes, the Line Item Veto Act violates the Presentment Clause. A President's cancellation of a statutory provision after a bill has been signed into law is the functional equivalent of a partial repeal, a legislative act that must conform to the procedures of Article I, § 7. The Constitution requires that a bill be approved or rejected in its entirety; it does not authorize the President to enact, amend, or repeal statutes. The law that results from a presidential cancellation is a different law from the one passed by both Houses of Congress, and it therefore fails the constitutionally mandated process of bicameralism and presentment. This power is distinguishable from historical delegations of discretionary spending authority, which were typically contingent on future events and executed congressional policy, whereas the Line Item Veto Act allows the President to reject the policy choices made by Congress.
Concurring - Justice Kennedy
Yes, the Line Item Veto Act is unconstitutional. The separation of powers is not a mere formalism but a fundamental protection of individual liberty. By allowing the President to unilaterally alter a law, the Act concentrates power in the Executive Branch, which threatens liberty by enabling the President to favor or disfavor specific groups or states. This mechanism gives the President the sole ability to hurt a targeted group to extract concessions from Congress, enhancing presidential power beyond what the Framers endorsed. That Congress voluntarily ceded this power is irrelevant, as one Congress cannot abdicate its constitutional responsibilities or those of future Congresses.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Scalia
No, the Line Item Veto Act does not violate the Presentment Clause with respect to spending items. The Presentment Clause was fully satisfied when the President signed the original bills into law. The subsequent cancellation is not a repeal but an exercise of discretionary authority delegated by Congress, which is historically permissible. There is no substantive difference between Congress authorizing the President to 'cancel' a spending item and authorizing him to 'decline to spend' appropriated funds, a practice that dates to the nation's founding. The cancellation power is a valid exercise of congressionally delegated executive discretion, not an unconstitutional usurpation of legislative power. (Justice Scalia also dissented on the issue of standing for the Snake River appellees, finding their alleged injury too speculative).
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
No, the Line Item Veto Act is a constitutional exercise of congressional power. The President's cancellation is not a repeal or amendment of a law, but an execution of it. Congress passed a law that included a contingent provision allowing the President to nullify certain spending items if he made specific budgetary determinations. This is a legitimate delegation of authority, not a violation of separation of powers. Given the complexity of modern omnibus budget bills, Congress should be allowed to devise novel means to achieve the constitutionally legitimate end of fiscal control. The standards in the Act are sufficiently intelligible to guide the President's discretion and survive a nondelegation challenge.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies a formalist interpretation of the legislative process mandated by Article I, holding that its specific procedures of bicameralism and presentment are the exclusive means for enacting or repealing federal law. The ruling invalidated a major piece of legislation sought by presidents for decades as a tool to control government spending, establishing that such power cannot be granted by statute alone. The case reinforces the precedent set in INS v. Chadha, limiting Congress's ability to delegate its core legislative powers and ensuring that any alteration to the lawmaking process must come through a constitutional amendment, not ordinary legislation. It has had a lasting impact on executive-legislative relations, particularly in the context of budgetary negotiations.
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