Clinton v. Babbitt
180 F.3d 1081, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5195, 99 Daily Journal DAR 6108 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
A court must dismiss an action if an Indian tribe, protected by sovereign immunity, is deemed a necessary and indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, particularly when a judgment rendered in its absence would prejudice its legal interests and no adequate remedy can be fashioned.
Facts:
- In 1882, President Chester A. Arthur issued an Executive Order creating a 2.5 million-acre reservation for the Hopi Tribe and for "such other Indians as the Secretary of Interior may see fit to settle thereon," which led to the substantial growth of the Navajo population in the area and conflicting claims over land use.
- In 1958, Congress authorized litigation between the Hopi Tribe and the Navajo Nation, resulting in a federal court determining 650,000 acres belonged exclusively to the Hopi Tribe and the remaining approximately 1.8 million acres became a "Joint Use Area" with undivided interests for both tribes.
- The Navajo and Hopi Indian Land Settlement Act of 1974 directed the partitioning of the Joint Use Area, and in 1979, a federal district court allocated approximately 900,000 acres, known as the Hopi Partitioned Lands (HPL), to the Hopi Tribe and a similar amount to the Navajo Nation.
- The 1974 Settlement Act required members of each tribe to move from lands partitioned to the other tribe by 1986, but about 50 to 100 Navajo families, referred to as "HPL Navajos," refused to leave the Hopi Partitioned Lands.
- Mediation and subsequent negotiations between the Hopi Tribe, the Navajo Nation, the United States, and HPL Navajo representatives resulted in a Settlement Agreement under which the Hopi Tribe agreed to permit HPL Navajo families to remain on the HPL under the terms of 75-year "accommodation leases" at no cost, for a three-acre homesite and ten acres of farmland, plus grazing and traditional use privileges.
- The Settlement Agreement also stipulated that the United States would pay the Hopi Tribe over $50.2 million in compensation and take up to 500,000 acres of land in trust for the Hopi Tribe, conditioned on the Tribe dismissing several claims against the United States and Secretary Babbitt approving certain numbers of accommodation leases.
- Congress ratified the Settlement Agreement and Accommodation Agreement in the Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute Settlement Act of 1996, also adding conditions, such as increasing the percentage of HPL Navajo households signing leases or relocating for land to be taken in trust.
- Alvin Clinton, Teddy Begay, Peggy Scott, Verna Clinton, Carlos Begay, Irena Babbitt Lane, Glenna Begay, and John Nez, as members of the Navajo Nation living on the HPL, were dissatisfied with the standard terms of the accommodation leases approved by the 1996 Settlement Act.
Procedural Posture:
- Alvin Clinton, Teddy Begay, Peggy Scott, Verna Clinton, Carlos Begay, Irena Babbitt Lane, Glenna Begay, and John Nez ("the plaintiffs") filed a complaint against Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt in federal district court, alleging the terms of accommodation leases violated the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and seeking declaratory judgments invalidating the 1996 Settlement Act and an injunction prohibiting Secretary Babbitt from approving accommodation leases.
- The district court dismissed the complaint, finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that the action was barred by sovereign immunity, that the Hopi Tribe was an indispensable party, and that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
- The plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the Hopi Tribe's sovereign immunity prevent its joinder in a lawsuit challenging the terms of accommodation leases it negotiated under federal settlement acts, thereby making it an indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and requiring dismissal of the action?
Opinions:
Majority - David R. Thompson
Yes, the Hopi Tribe's sovereign immunity prevents its joinder in a lawsuit challenging the terms of accommodation leases it negotiated under federal settlement acts, thereby making it an indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and requiring dismissal of the action. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, although it reversed the lower court's findings on subject matter jurisdiction and sovereign immunity for the United States. The Ninth Circuit found that federal question jurisdiction existed due to the plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment equal protection claim and that the Administrative Procedure Act waived the U.S.'s sovereign immunity for nonmonetary relief. However, the court agreed with the district court that the Hopi Tribe was both a "necessary" and "indispensable" party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. The Tribe was deemed "necessary" because complete relief could not be afforded among the existing parties in its absence, as a court cannot adjudicate an attack on a negotiated agreement without jurisdiction over the parties to that agreement. Furthermore, a judgment in the plaintiffs' favor would impair or impede the Tribe's legally protected interests, which included receiving substantial compensation from the United States conditioned on lease approvals, its sovereign capacity to balance royalties and sacred site protection, and its interest in regaining jurisdiction over the HPL. Since the Hopi Tribe enjoys sovereign immunity, it could not be joined as a party without its consent, which it had not given. The Tribe was then found to be "indispensable" because a judgment rendered in the plaintiffs' favor would be highly prejudicial to the Tribe, preventing it from fulfilling its obligations under the Settlement Agreement and collecting millions in compensation. No protective provisions in the judgment or shaping of relief could lessen this prejudice without undermining the plaintiffs' requested relief. While the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs lacked an alternative forum to seek relief, it concluded that the Hopi Tribe's interest in maintaining its sovereign immunity outweighed the plaintiffs' interest in litigating their claim. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument for a "public rights" exception to joinder rules, holding it inapplicable where the relief sought would destroy the legal entitlements of an absent party.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the principle of tribal sovereign immunity, demonstrating its powerful effect on litigation involving agreements that centrally affect Indian tribes. By affirming that a tribe is an indispensable party when its interests are directly implicated and it cannot be joined due to sovereign immunity, the court effectively shields tribes from challenges to their negotiated agreements, even if plaintiffs allege constitutional violations. The ruling highlights that in such disputes, the protection of tribal sovereignty often overrides the lack of an alternative judicial remedy for plaintiffs, placing a substantial burden on parties to consider tribal consent or alternative dispute resolution mechanisms from the outset. This creates a high bar for challenging federal actions or agreements when an immune tribe is a key participant, limiting avenues for judicial review of multi-party agreements involving tribal interests.
