Clinkscales v. Carver
22 Cal. 2d 72, 136 P.2d 777, 1943 Cal. LEXIS 164 (1943)
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Rule of Law:
An irregularly authorized traffic sign, appearing to be a regular exercise of public authority, can establish a standard of care for civil negligence purposes, even if its irregular authorization prevents criminal prosecution.
Facts:
- On May 20, 1937, an automobile collision occurred at the intersection of Highline Road and Oat Canal Road in Imperial County.
- Defendant was driving north on Highline Road, and Richard Clinkscales was proceeding west on Oat Canal Road.
- A stop-sign had been placed on Highline Road at the intersection in 1936 by a road foreman, with the permission of the district supervisor, to give gravel trucks the right of way on Oat Canal Road.
- Defendant was familiar with this stop-sign but did not stop his car before entering the intersection.
- Defendant looked in both directions but did not see Clinkscales' car approaching.
- The collision resulted in the death of Richard Clinkscales.
- A resolution by the Board of Supervisors of Imperial County on January 4, 1927, purported to establish 'Boulevard stops' at county road intersections 'as provided and authorized by Ordinance No. 82'.
- Ordinance No. 82, passed on July 10, 1926, never became effective due to admitted defects in its publication.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs, Richard Clinkscales' wife and daughter, brought an action in trial court to recover damages for his death.
- The trial court instructed the jury that a driver was required to stop at the intersection, and failure to do so, if proximately causing the accident, should result in a verdict for the plaintiffs.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs.
- Judgment was entered on the jury's verdict.
- Defendant appealed from the judgment to the Supreme Court of California.
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Issue:
Does an irregularly authorized stop-sign, placed by public authorities in the customary way and appearing to be regularly established, nevertheless set a standard of care such that its violation constitutes negligence as a matter of law in a civil action for damages?
Opinions:
Majority - Traynor, J.
Yes, an irregularly authorized stop-sign can establish a standard of care for civil negligence, making its violation negligence as a matter of law. The court reasoned that civil liability for negligence does not necessarily depend on criminal liability, as a statute or regulation’s significance in a civil suit lies in its formulation of a standard of conduct that the court adopts. Even if conduct cannot be punished criminally due to irregularities in the prohibitory provisions' adoption, the legislative standard may still apply if it serves as an appropriate measure for the defendant's conduct. Disregarding a visibly placed stop-sign, which appears to be placed by public authority in the customary way and upon which the public naturally relies, constitutes unreasonably dangerous conduct and is negligence as a matter of law, regardless of any irregularity in the sign's authorization. To rule otherwise would allow the sign to become a trap for innocent persons relying upon it. The court cited precedents emphasizing that the court decides the civil standard, adopting legislative standards except where they would impose liability without fault, and that failure to observe a stop-sign is inherently dangerous.
Dissenting - Shenk, J.
No, an irregularly authorized stop-sign should not set a standard of care such that its violation constitutes negligence as a matter of law. The dissenting opinion argued that the trial court's instruction that the defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law was based on the false assumption that Highline Road was legally signposted. Since the stop-sign lacked legal authorization, the question of the defendant’s negligence under the circumstances should have been a question of fact for the jury to decide. The dissent contended that existing case law only supports the idea that a 'de facto' stop-sign may be considered by the jury in determining negligence, not that it dictates negligence as a matter of law. The withdrawal of this issue from the jury was prejudicially erroneous, especially given evidence suggesting the deceased driver may have been negligent by traveling on the wrong side of the road at an excessive speed.
Analysis:
This case is significant for clarifying the distinction between criminal and civil liability regarding statutory violations, particularly in the context of negligence per se. It establishes that courts can adopt legislative standards of conduct for civil liability even if the underlying regulation is technically flawed, provided the standard is an appropriate measure of reasonable conduct and the public reasonably relies upon it. This prevents tortfeasors from escaping liability due to minor procedural defects unknown to the public, thereby reinforcing public safety expectations and the principle of reasonable care.
