Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage
1981 Alas. LEXIS 610, 631 P.2d 1073 (1981)
Rule of Law:
The defense of necessity is generally inapplicable to criminal trespass charges arising from protests against lawful human conduct, such as abortions, where adequate legal alternatives for protest exist, and the harm sought to be avoided is not disproportionately greater than the harm caused by the illegal act.
Facts:
- On January 6, 1978, members of Alaska Right to Life, including Head, Fardig, Sigfried, and Cleveland, participated in a nationwide anti-abortion protest outside the Alaska Hospital and Clinic building in Anchorage.
- Head, Fardig, Sigfried, and Cleveland then entered the Alaska Clinic to conduct a more direct protest.
- Head and Siegfried handcuffed themselves to the operating room door, while Cleveland and Fardig handcuffed themselves to an operating table.
- Mingo, the building security supervisor, asked the appellants to leave, and when they refused, he used boltcutters to free them and escorted all four from the building, advising them not to return.
- Moments later, the appellants re-entered the building and again approached the operating room.
- Mingo again stopped them and requested them to leave; Fardig, Cleveland, and Siegfried sat on the floor, and Head sat at the building's main entrance.
- City police were summoned and, after again requesting the appellants to leave and being refused, arrested them.
Procedural Posture:
- Appellants Head, Fardig, Sigfried, and Cleveland were each charged with violating Anchorage's criminal trespass ordinance in district court.
- All four appellants were convicted under the ordinance in district court.
- The convictions were affirmed on appeal to the superior court.
- Appellants appealed the superior court's affirmance to the Alaska Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the defense of necessity justify criminal trespass into an abortion clinic by protestors seeking to prevent abortions?
Opinions:
Majority - Rabinowitz, Chief Justice
No, the defense of necessity does not justify criminal trespass into an abortion clinic by protestors seeking to prevent abortions. The court affirmed the convictions, finding the necessity defense inapplicable for several reasons. First, the harm or emergency that warrants a necessity defense must typically arise from physical forces of nature, not from lawful human conduct. Since abortion is lawful in Alaska, the alleged harm sought to be avoided was not unlawful. Second, drawing from State v. Marley, the court determined that adequate legal alternatives for protest were available to the appellants, and their actions were not reasonably designed to actually halt abortions but rather to protest them, merely postponing any scheduled procedures. Third, the court found that the harm sought to be avoided (the routine performance of lawful abortions) was not greater than the foreseeable harm caused by the trespassers' actions, which included disrupting the clinic's schedule, requiring resterilization of the operating room, and causing emotional distress to patients. The court also held that, regarding the balancing of interests, the legislature had already weighed the interests in potential life against the privacy interests of individuals, siding with the latter in the context of lawful abortions. The court also rejected claims of defective complaints (minor formal error without prejudice) and confusing jury instructions (harmless error, as the erroneous instruction favored the appellants and was rejected by the jury, thus not affecting substantial rights).
Concurring - Dimond, Senior Justice
No, the defense of necessity does not justify criminal trespass in this case, although the justice believed it might in very limited, specific circumstances not present here. Justice Dimond concurred with the majority's affirmance, emphasizing that the appellants' conduct constituted a general protest against abortions, rather than an attempt to prevent a specific, imminent, and unlawful harm. He asserted that public policy prohibits using the necessity defense to excuse acts of civil disobedience, regardless of the protestors' moral motivations, because allowing individuals to choose which laws to obey based on personal beliefs would lead to societal chaos. He cited legal precedents stating that those who engage in civil disobedience, even for a moral cause, must be willing to accept the legal consequences. While personally disagreeing with the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade regarding the beginning of human life, he believed that such views must be pursued through the political process rather than unlawful action. He noted in a footnote that a highly specific, direct prevention of a particular abortion (e.g., by a husband) under unique circumstances might theoretically invoke the defense, but explicitly stated this case did not present such facts and that the majority's reasons for disallowing it were appropriate.
Analysis:
This case significantly narrows the application of the necessity defense in criminal law, particularly when invoked in the context of civil disobedience against lawful activities. It clarifies that deeply held moral or religious beliefs do not, by themselves, create a legal justification for violating laws, especially when lawful avenues for protest exist. The ruling reinforces the principle of judicial deference to legislative determinations of public policy and the balancing of societal interests. For future cases, this precedent will likely be instrumental in rejecting similar necessity defenses brought by protestors challenging legally sanctioned but controversial practices, emphasizing the importance of non-criminal means of effecting social and political change and upholding the rule of law over individual moral judgments.
