Clean Air Council v. Pruitt
Decided July 3, 2017 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
Under Section 307(d)(7)(B) of the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may only stay a final rule pending reconsideration if the objections forming the basis for reconsideration were impracticable to raise during the public comment period and are of central relevance to the rule's outcome.
Facts:
- In June 2016, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), under Administrator Gina McCarthy, issued a final rule regulating methane emissions from the oil and natural gas industries (the 'methane rule').
- The rule took effect on August 2, 2016, and required regulated companies to conduct an initial survey to identify leaks by June 3, 2017.
- Following the rule's publication, several industry groups, including the American Petroleum Institute (API), filed administrative petitions with the EPA seeking reconsideration.
- The industry groups argued that several provisions in the final rule were not in the proposed rule, making it impracticable for them to have commented on those provisions, and requested a stay.
- In April 2017, the new EPA Administrator, Scott Pruitt, announced that the agency would reconsider certain provisions of the methane rule.
- On June 5, 2017, two days after the compliance deadline, the EPA published a notice officially staying the effectiveness of certain parts of the rule for 90 days, making the stay retroactive to June 2, 2017.
- On June 16, 2017, the EPA published a proposal to extend the stay for two years.
Procedural Posture:
- The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a final rule regulating methane emissions in June 2016.
- Several industry groups filed administrative petitions with the EPA, seeking reconsideration and a stay of the rule.
- The EPA Administrator granted reconsideration and issued a 90-day stay of parts of the rule.
- A coalition of environmental organizations ('Environmental Petitioners') filed an emergency motion for a stay or, in the alternative, summary vacatur of the EPA's stay in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
- The EPA (respondent) and a group of industry associations (intervenors) opposed the motion.
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Issue:
Does Section 307(d)(7)(B) of the Clean Air Act authorize the Environmental Protection Agency to stay a final rule pending reconsideration when the objections forming the basis for that reconsideration could have been, and in fact were, raised during the public comment period?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. Section 307(d)(7)(B) of the Clean Air Act does not authorize the EPA to stay a final rule where the objections providing the basis for reconsideration were not impracticable to raise during the comment period. First, the court has jurisdiction to review the stay because, unlike a mere decision to reconsider, a stay is a final agency action. It consummates the agency's decision-making regarding the rule's effective date and alters legal rights and obligations by relieving regulated parties of their duty to comply. Second, on the merits, the EPA's authority to issue a stay under this section is expressly linked to the two requirements for mandatory reconsideration: that an objection was 'impracticable' to raise and is of 'central relevance.' The court examined the four grounds on which the EPA based its stay—low-production wells, alternative means of compliance, professional engineer certification for vent systems, and pneumatic pump exemptions—and found that the administrative record demonstrates that the EPA's proposed rule solicited comments on all four topics and that industry groups did, in fact, submit extensive comments on them. Because the final rule was a 'logical outgrowth' of the proposed rule, it was not impracticable for the industry groups to raise their objections. Therefore, the statutory prerequisites for a stay were not met, rendering the EPA's action arbitrary, capricious, and in excess of its statutory authority.
Dissenting - Brown, Circuit Judge
The court should not decide this case because it lacks jurisdiction. The EPA’s decision to issue a temporary, 90-day stay of a rule is not a 'final agency action' subject to judicial review. A stay is an interlocutory step that merely 'hits the pause button' on a rule's effectiveness; it does not represent the consummation of the agency's decision-making process, which is still ongoing through the reconsideration proceeding. Reviewing the stay allows the court to improperly conduct a backdoor review of the decision to grant reconsideration, which the majority concedes is unreviewable. Furthermore, the stay does not fix any legal relationships or create binding obligations, as it merely announces the agency will not enforce the rule for a short period. Therefore, the stay does not satisfy the Supreme Court's two-part test for finality, and the environmental petitioners' motion should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Analysis:
This decision significantly curtails an agency's ability to unilaterally halt a duly promulgated regulation through a procedural stay. It clarifies that the Clean Air Act's reconsideration provision is a narrow exception, not a broad grant of discretionary authority for a new administration to suspend rules it disfavors. The ruling reinforces the principle that an agency is bound by its own regulations until amended through the formal notice-and-comment process. It also sets an important D.C. Circuit precedent on the finality and reviewability of agency stays, confirming that an action relieving a party of a legal obligation is a judicially reviewable final action, just as an action imposing one is.
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