Clark v. Edens
2011 OK 28, 254 P.3d 672 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
A man's statutory presumption of paternity for a child born during his marriage is not rebutted by a "no children" finding in a subsequent divorce decree if paternity was not actually litigated. A mother may be equitably estopped from using a genetic test to challenge this presumption if she has allowed the man to act in a parental role for a significant period.
Facts:
- Peter Andrew Clark and Jamie Michelle Clark Edens were married on October 10, 1998.
- During the marriage, Ms. Edens gave birth to a child, M.A.C., on January 8, 2001.
- Mr. Clark was designated as M.A.C.'s father on the child's birth certificate.
- Within two years of M.A.C.'s birth, a genetic test was performed which excluded Mr. Clark as the biological father.
- The parties divorced on September 6, 2002.
- From the time of the divorce in 2002 until June 2009, Mr. Clark paid child support and exercised regular visitation with M.A.C.
- In June 2009, Ms. Edens discontinued Mr. Clark's visitation with M.A.C.
Procedural Posture:
- Peter Andrew Clark sought a declaratory judgment in an Oklahoma trial court to establish that he is the presumptive father of M.A.C.
- The trial court denied declaratory relief to Mr. Clark, ruling that the divorce decree and his prior actions rebutted any presumption of paternity.
- Mr. Clark, as appellant, appealed the trial court's decision to the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals.
- The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Ms. Edens, the appellee.
- The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the appellate court's decision.
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Issue:
Does a finding in a divorce decree that there are 'No child(ren) of this marriage,' combined with a prior unadjudicated genetic test excluding the husband as the biological father, rebut the statutory presumption that a man is the father of a child born during the marriage?
Opinions:
Majority - Reif, J.
No. A 'no children' finding in a divorce decree and an unadjudicated genetic test do not rebut the statutory presumption of paternity where the issue of paternity was not actually litigated and where the mother’s conduct equitably estops her from challenging the father-child relationship. The presumption of paternity is a matter of public policy intended for the benefit and protection of children born during a marriage. The finding in the divorce decree that there were 'no children' did not resolve the parties' relationship to M.A.C. because paternity was never actually litigated. Furthermore, Mr. Clark's statement in a previously dismissed divorce petition did not constitute a waiver of his paternity claim, as this public policy right cannot be waived by a private party in a manner that thwarts the statute's purpose. Finally, Ms. Edens is equitably estopped from using the genetic test to rebut the presumption because she allowed Mr. Clark to act as a father for nearly seven years after the divorce by accepting support and permitting visitation, thereby fostering a parental relationship.
Analysis:
This decision significantly reinforces the legal and social importance of a presumed father's role, potentially elevating an established parental relationship over biological fact. It establishes that a general finding of 'no children' in a divorce decree is not dispositive of paternity unless the issue was specifically contested and adjudicated. The ruling's application of equitable estoppel in this context serves to protect the stability of the parent-child relationship, preventing a parent from disestablishing paternity after years of acknowledging and benefiting from the presumed parent's involvement.
