Clark v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co.
1915 Kan. LEXIS 83, 146 P. 320, 94 Kan. 268 (1915)
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Rule of Law:
The negligent act of abandoning a dangerous instrumentality remains the proximate cause of a subsequent injury, even if a third party intervenes, so long as the intervention was a natural and probable consequence of the original negligence that ought to have been foreseen.
Facts:
- An agent for the E. I. Dupont de Nemours Powder Company, Van Gray, used solidified glycerine to 'shoot' an oil well on J. McDowell's farm.
- After completing the job, Van Gray negligently left about a quart of solidified glycerine near the well.
- Joe McDowell, a worker at the well, found the explosive and, fearing for the safety of himself and his coworkers, took it to his home.
- After his mother protested, McDowell moved the glycerine to an abandoned graveyard on the farm, hiding it in a crevice of a stone fence.
- Over two years later, on December 23, 1911, the two minor sons of Steve Clark found the solidified glycerine.
- The next day, the Clark boys returned, and one of them struck the substance with a rock, causing an explosion that resulted in their injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- Steve Clark, the father of the two injured boys, sued E. I. Dupont de Nemours Powder Company in the trial court to recover damages.
- The trial court found in favor of Clark and awarded him $1,632.75.
- E. I. Dupont de Nemours Powder Company (appellant) appealed the judgment to this court.
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Issue:
Does the act of a third person in moving a dangerously abandoned explosive to a new location constitute an independent, intervening cause that severs the causal link between the original negligent act and a subsequent injury?
Opinions:
Majority - Dawson, J.
No, the act of a third person moving the explosive does not sever the causal link. The original wrongdoer remains liable if the intervening act was a foreseeable consequence of the initial negligence. The court reasoned that those who control inherently dangerous explosives are held to the highest degree of care, and this duty never ceases. The central test for proximate cause is whether the injury was a natural and probable consequence of the original negligence. Here, the court found that the intervening act by Joe McDowell did not introduce a 'new power of doing mischief' to the glycerine; the danger was inherent in the substance itself from the moment it was abandoned. McDowell's attempt to secure the explosive, while ultimately unsuccessful, was a foreseeable result of the powder company's negligence. Therefore, his actions were not an independent, superseding cause that would absolve the company of liability.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high standard of care imposed on parties handling inherently dangerous instrumentalities like explosives. It clarifies the doctrine of intervening cause, establishing that a third party's actions do not automatically break the chain of causation if those actions are a foreseeable consequence of the original tortfeasor's negligence. The ruling makes it more difficult for a defendant to escape liability by pointing to subsequent events, especially when their negligence created the very situation that invited intervention. This precedent solidifies the principle that proximate cause analysis often hinges on foreseeability, which is typically a question of fact for the jury.
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