Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence

Supreme Court of United States
468 U.S. 288 (1984)

ELI5:

Sections

Rule of Law:

Reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions on expressive conduct are constitutionally permissible, provided they are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample alternative channels for communication.

Facts:

The National Park Service (NPS) is responsible for managing national parks, including Lafayette Park and the Mall in Washington, D.C.
An NPS regulation permits camping only in designated areas and defines camping to include sleeping or making preparations to sleep.
Lafayette Park and the Mall have never been designated as camping areas.
The Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), an organization advocating for the homeless, obtained an NPS permit to conduct a demonstration in Lafayette Park and the Mall.
The permit authorized CCNV to erect two symbolic tent cities, one in each location, to protest the plight of the homeless.
CCNV requested permission for demonstrators to sleep in the tents as a core part of their expressive message.
Citing its anti-camping regulation, the NPS granted the permit for the tents but specifically denied the request to allow demonstrators to sleep in them.

Procedural Posture:

Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) sued the government in the United States District Court, seeking to prevent the enforcement of the no-camping regulation.
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Park Service.
CCNV, as appellant, appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed the district court's judgment, holding that the application of the regulation violated the First Amendment.
The government, as petitioner, successfully petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari.

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Issue:

Does a National Park Service regulation prohibiting camping, including sleeping, in certain national parks violate the First Amendment when applied to demonstrators who wish to sleep in symbolic tents as part of a protest on the plight of the homeless?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice White

No. The National Park Service regulation is a valid time, place, or manner restriction that does not violate the First Amendment. Assuming for the sake of argument that sleeping in this context is expressive conduct, the regulation is a permissible restriction because it is content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leaves open alternative channels of communication. The ban on camping is content-neutral as it applies to all groups, regardless of their message. The government has a significant interest in maintaining the national parks in an attractive and intact condition for public use. The ban on sleeping is narrowly tailored to serve this interest by preventing wear and tear on park lands. Finally, the regulation leaves open ample alternatives for CCNV to communicate its message, such as the symbolic tents themselves and a 24-hour vigil.

Dissenting - Justice Marshall

Yes. The regulation, as applied, unconstitutionally abridges the demonstrators' First Amendment rights. The majority fails to appreciate that sleeping is the most powerful and integral part of the symbolic speech in this demonstration, intended to reenact the central reality of homelessness. The government's asserted interest in park preservation is not substantially furthered by banning sleeping, especially since it permits other potentially disruptive activities like the erection of tents and a 24-hour vigil. The regulation is not narrowly tailored because the government failed to show that this specific expressive act would cause significant harm. By applying minimal scrutiny to this content-neutral regulation, the Court fails to protect crucial expressive activity, particularly for disadvantaged groups who lack access to more conventional means of communication.

Concurring - Chief Justice Burger

No. The demonstrators' actions do not constitute speech; they are merely conduct. The First Amendment protects freedom of speech, not any and all conduct that an individual may claim is expressive. Pitching a tent and sleeping is camping, an action which interferes with the public's right to use and enjoy the park. To treat this conduct as protected speech trivializes the First Amendment.

Analysis:

This decision solidifies the principle that content-neutral regulations of public forums are subject to a less stringent level of scrutiny than content-based restrictions. It effectively merges the O'Brien test for symbolic conduct with the time, place, or manner test, giving government entities significant deference in managing public property. The ruling makes it more difficult for protestors to use unconventional or disruptive methods as forms of expression if those methods violate general, neutrally-applied rules. By prioritizing the government's managerial interest in park preservation over the expressive value of the specific conduct, the case signals a broad judicial deference to administrative judgments concerning the use of public spaces.

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