Clancey v. McBride
169 N.E. 729, 338 Ill. 35 (1929)
Rule of Law:
A single negligent act that simultaneously causes both personal injury and property damage creates two distinct causes of action, allowing for separate lawsuits to recover damages for each. Consequently, a judgment rendered for property damage does not bar a subsequent action for personal injuries arising from the same incident.
Facts:
- Marie Clancey and Thomas G. McBride were involved in a collision between their automobiles at the intersection of Wisconsin avenue and Randolph street in the village of Oak Park, in Cook county.
- As a result of the collision, Marie Clancey sustained personal injuries.
- As a result of the collision, Marie Clancey's automobile was damaged.
Procedural Posture:
- Marie Clancey sued Thomas G. McBride before a justice of the peace to recover compensation for damage to her automobile.
- After a trial, the justice of the peace rendered judgment in favor of Marie Clancey for $275, which Thomas G. McBride subsequently satisfied.
- Marie Clancey then instituted a separate suit in the superior court of Cook County against Thomas G. McBride to recover damages for her personal injuries.
- The superior court jury awarded Marie Clancey $2000, which was reduced by remittitur to $1500, and judgment was entered against Thomas G. McBride.
- Thomas G. McBride prosecuted an appeal to the Appellate Court for the First District, which reversed the judgment of the superior court and remanded the cause with directions to enter judgment for Thomas G. McBride, holding that the prior judgment for property damage constituted a bar to the instant suit.
- Marie Clancey petitioned the Supreme Court of Illinois for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does a single tortious act that causes both personal injury and property damage to the same person give rise to one indivisible cause of action, or to two separate and distinct causes of action, one for personal injury and one for property damage?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice DeYoung
No, a single tortious act that causes both personal injury and property damage gives rise to separate and distinct causes of action for each type of injury. The court affirmed that the common law recognizes distinct rights related to a person and their property. While both wrongs stem from a single act, the consequences invade two separate rights: the right to bodily integrity and the right to have one's property free from damage. The court reasoned that it would be 'unsatisfactory' to consider damage to property as the same injury as damage to a person. It highlighted several practical and legal distinctions that justify treating personal injury and property damage claims separately. These differences include the assignability of rights of action (personal injury claims are generally not assignable, while property damage claims are), the ability of creditors to seize the right of action, the passage of the right to a trustee in bankruptcy, the different evidence required to prove each type of damage, the differing statutory causes of action if death results, and the different statutes of limitation (two years for personal injury, five years for property damage). Given these fundamental differences, the court concluded that while these distinct causes of action may be joined in a single suit in a competent court, a judgment recovered for property damage does not bar a subsequent action to recover damages for personal injuries.
Analysis:
This case is legally significant for clarifying the scope of res judicata (claim preclusion) when a single tortious act results in both personal injury and property damage. It establishes that, at least in Illinois, these are distinct causes of action, thereby allowing for separate lawsuits. This ruling ensures that victims can pursue full compensation for all types of harm, even if initial claims are brought in courts with limited jurisdiction, and prevents the prior resolution of a minor property claim from precluding a more substantial personal injury claim. It emphasizes the fundamental distinction between the rights associated with one's person and one's property.
