Civic v. Signature Collision Centers, LLC & H.P. West End, LLC
Not yet published in final reporter; cited as D.C. Ct. App. No. 18-CV-191 (Dec. 19, 2019) (2019)
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Rule of Law:
In the District of Columbia, a violation of a general building or elevator code provision does not automatically establish negligence per se, thereby lifting the bar of contributory negligence, unless the statute or regulation was specifically intended to protect 'classes of persons likely to be careless' from their own negligence or addresses a specific public policy concern.
Facts:
- In February 2013, Melanne Civic fell on a 'handicap ramp' while walking out of an automobile-repair shop.
- The automobile-repair shop was operated by Signature Collision Centers, LLC and owned by H.P. West End, LLC.
- Melanne Civic fell because of an unmarked vertical and horizontal gap between a landing and the ramp.
- Melanne Civic's expert testified that the vertical component of the gap was two to three inches and that the gap was inconsistent with D.C. Building Code § 1003.6 requirements for a continuous unobstructed path of egress, deeming it unsafe.
- Melanne Civic had previously gone in and out of the repair shop.
- At the time of the fall, Melanne Civic was carrying a boot and a cell phone.
- Melanne Civic did not recall whether she was using the handrail when she fell.
Procedural Posture:
- Melanne Civic sued Signature Collision Centers, LLC and H.P. West End, LLC in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (trial court/court of first instance), alleging that their negligence was responsible for her injuries.
- A jury in the Superior Court found that Signature and H.P. West End had been negligent, but also found that Melanne Civic’s contributory negligence barred her from recovering.
- Melanne Civic (appellant) appealed the Superior Court's judgment to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erroneously declined to instruct the jury on the issue of per se negligence.
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Issue:
Does a violation of a general provision of the D.C. Building Code, specifically § 1003.6 regarding continuous egress paths, constitute negligence per se such that it automatically bars the defense of contributory negligence in a personal injury action?
Opinions:
Majority - McLeese, Associate Judge
No, a violation of a general provision of the D.C. Building Code, such as § 1003.6, does not constitute negligence per se that automatically bars the defense of contributory negligence in the circumstances of this case. In the District of Columbia, a plaintiff generally cannot recover if found contributorily negligent. This bar is lifted only if the defendant's conduct violated a statute or regulation intended to provide "classes of persons likely to be careless . . . greater protection than that which might be afforded at common law," a principle known as "negligence per se." The court found no basis to conclude that § 1003.6, as part of the general Building Code, was intended to provide such heightened protections for unusually vulnerable persons. Citing precedents like Phillips v. Fujitec Am., Inc. and District of Columbia v. Brown, the court reiterated that general building and elevator codes primarily establish a standard of reasonable care and are not intended to protect individuals from their own negligence. The court clarified that its prior decision in Scoggins v. Jude, concerning the Housing Regulations, established an exception where landlords cannot rely on contributory negligence for tenants simply using or failing to repair premises, due to the public policy of the Housing Regulations, but this specific policy does not apply to general Building Code violations. Finally, the court held that Perkinson v. Gilbert/Robinson, Inc., a D.C. Circuit decision that supported the appellant's position, was not binding on the D.C. Court of Appeals and was decided before subsequent D.C. Court of Appeals cases clarified the limited scope of per se negligence in this context. Any error regarding testimony on another safety provision (ANSI A117.1) was deemed harmless because the jury already found the appellees negligent, but also found Ms. Civic contributorily negligent.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of the negligence per se doctrine in the District of Columbia, particularly concerning the interaction with the contributory negligence defense. It reinforces that a mere violation of a general building code provision does not automatically remove the contributory negligence bar, emphasizing that the intent behind the statute — specifically, whether it aims to protect a vulnerable class from its own carelessness — is paramount. This ruling limits the instances in which a plaintiff can overcome a contributory negligence defense based solely on code violations, providing a crucial distinction for future personal injury cases involving statutory standards. It also firmly asserts the D.C. Court of Appeals' authority as the final arbiter of local D.C. law, even when federal appellate decisions may suggest a different interpretation.
