City of West Covina v. Perkins
119 S. Ct. 678, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 507, 142 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require law enforcement agencies to provide individualized notice of state-law remedies for the return of property lawfully seized but no longer needed for investigation or prosecution, when those remedies are established by publicly available statutes and case law.
Facts:
- Police officers from the city of West Covina, California, acting pursuant to a valid search warrant, searched the home of Lawrence Perkins and his family.
- The suspect in the crime was Marcus Marsh, a former boarder, not Perkins or his family.
- During the search, officers seized various items belonging to Perkins, including photos, an address book, weapons, ammunition, and cash.
- At the conclusion of the search, officers left Perkins a form titled “Search Warrant: Notice of Service,” which identified the searching agency, date of search, issuing judge, court, and contact information for further inquiry, along with an itemized list of seized property.
- The officers did not leave the search warrant number because it was under seal to protect the ongoing homicide investigation, though its issuance was recorded in a public court clerk index by address and warrant number.
- Perkins contacted a detective listed on the notice and was told he needed a court order to retrieve his property.
- Perkins visited the Citrus Municipal Court to see the issuing Judge Oki, but learned the judge was on vacation, and another judge told him the court had no record under Perkins’ name.
- Rather than pursuing a court order through a written motion or other inquiries, Perkins and his family filed a lawsuit against the City and the officers.
Procedural Posture:
- Police officers of the City of West Covina seized personal property from the home of Lawrence Perkins and his family pursuant to a search warrant.
- Perkins and his family (respondents) filed suit in United States District Court against the City and the officers, alleging Fourth Amendment violations and a city policy permitting unlawful searches.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for the City and its officers on the Fourth Amendment claims, but invited supplemental briefing on whether available remedies for return of seized property satisfied due process.
- The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court for a resolution of the due process question.
- On remand, the District Court held that California law remedies for return of seized property satisfied due process and granted summary judgment for the City.
- Perkins and his family appealed the District Court's decision to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the City was required to give notice of state procedures for property return and the information necessary to invoke them.
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Issue:
Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require a city to provide individualized notice of state-law remedies and the specific factual information necessary to invoke those remedies for the return of property lawfully seized by police, when those remedies are established by published, generally available state statutes and case law?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Kennedy
No, the Due Process Clause does not require law enforcement to provide individualized notice of state-law remedies for the return of seized property when those remedies are established by publicly available statutes and case law. The Court held that the primary purpose of due process notice is to ensure a meaningful opportunity for a hearing, which means that when property is seized, law enforcement must take reasonable steps to notify the owner that the property has been taken so they can pursue available remedies. However, no similar rationale justifies requiring individualized notice of state-law remedies that are established by published, generally available state statutes and case law. Once an owner is informed of the seizure, they can consult these public sources to learn about the remedial procedures. The Court distinguished its prior decision in Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, where notice of administrative procedures was required because those procedures were not publicly available. The Court noted that the expansive notice requirement imposed by the Court of Appeals lacked support in precedent and conflicted with the well-established practice of both states and the federal government, which typically only require notice of the seizure and an inventory of property. The Court also rejected the argument that the notice was inadequate for failing to provide the search warrant number, noting that the District Court had found no evidence that the number was necessary to file a motion for return of property.
Concurring - Justice Thomas
Yes, the Due Process Clause does not compel the city to provide detailed notice of state-law post-deprivation remedies, and Justice Thomas concurs with this judgment. However, he writes separately to express his disagreement with the majority’s suggestion, in dicta, that due process generally requires officers to take reasonable steps to give notice that property has been taken. Justice Thomas argued that procedural due process principles, typically developed in civil cases, should not govern the execution of a criminal search warrant. He asserted that the Fourth Amendment, specifically tailored for the criminal justice system, defines the 'process that is due' for seizures in criminal cases. He pointed to common-law practices, such as providing an inventory of seized goods, which informed the understanding of a 'reasonable' search under the Fourth Amendment, citing cases like Wilkes v. Wood and Entick v. Carrington. While open to considering a Fourth Amendment basis for a notice requirement in an appropriate case, he found the majority’s reliance on procedural due process to be ahistorical and unwarranted.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the scope of due process notice requirements concerning property seized during criminal investigations. It establishes that while due process requires notice of the fact of seizure to allow owners to pursue remedies, it does not mandate individualized notice of publicly available legal procedures for property return. This ruling limits the burden on law enforcement agencies, reinforcing the principle that citizens are generally expected to inform themselves of public laws. The concurrence, while agreeing with the outcome, highlights a potential future debate over whether such notice requirements might be rooted in the Fourth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, suggesting a different analytical framework for criminal procedure cases.
