City of Tucson v. Pima County
199 Ariz. 509, 19 P.3d 650, 343 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
A state statute requiring an unincorporated community within an "urbanized area" to obtain consent from a proximate, existing municipality before it can incorporate does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of promoting orderly urban development.
Facts:
- The unincorporated areas of Tortolita and Casas Adobes are located within six miles of the incorporated City of Tucson and the Towns of Marana and Oro Valley.
- Due to this proximity, Arizona law defines these areas as "urbanized areas."
- State law, specifically A.R.S. § 9-101.01(B)(1), generally prohibits an urbanized area from incorporating without first receiving a resolution of approval from the neighboring city that establishes the urbanized area's existence.
- Proponents of incorporation for Tortolita and Casas Adobes gathered petitions to begin the process of forming their own municipalities.
- The City of Tucson, the primary neighboring city, did not consent to the proposed incorporations.
- In 1997, the Arizona Legislature enacted a temporary law, applicable only to Pima County, that suspended this consent requirement for a two-year period, which prompted the filing of the incorporation petitions.
Procedural Posture:
- The City of Tucson filed a complaint in Pima County Superior Court (a state trial court) challenging a temporary law that suspended the municipal consent requirement for incorporation.
- The superior court initially upheld the temporary law, and the Pima County Board of Supervisors proceeded with incorporation steps for Tortolita and Casas Adobes.
- On appeal in a prior case (Woods), the Arizona Court of Appeals found the temporary law unconstitutional and remanded the case to the superior court.
- On remand, the incorporation proponents (Pima County, Tortolita, etc.) raised federal constitutional challenges against the underlying permanent consent statute, A.R.S. § 9-101.01.
- The superior court granted judgment in favor of the City of Tucson and the State of Arizona, holding that the consent statute was constitutional.
- The incorporation proponents (appellants) appealed that judgment to the Arizona Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does Arizona Revised Statute § 9-101.01(B)(1), which requires an unincorporated community located within a specified proximity to an existing city to obtain that city's consent before incorporating, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the First Amendment right to petition the government?
Opinions:
Majority - Ehrlich, Judge
No. The Arizona statute requiring consent from a proximate municipality for incorporation does not violate the Equal Protection Clause or the First Amendment. States possess broad, plenary power over the creation and management of their political subdivisions, and there is no fundamental constitutional right to vote on municipal incorporation. Because no fundamental right or suspect class is implicated, the statute is subject only to rational basis review. The law is rationally related to the legitimate state interests of promoting orderly development, ensuring efficient municipal administration, and preventing the fragmentation or "Balkanization" of counties. The statute also does not violate the First Amendment right to petition, as it does not deny citizens access to any branch of government; a potential lack of success in a petition process is not a denial of the right itself. Finally, the court cannot inquire into the motives of the City of Tucson for denying consent, as this is a delegated legislative function protected by the separation of powers doctrine.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle of state supremacy over the creation and organization of municipalities, affirming the doctrine from the landmark case Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh. It clarifies that procedural prerequisites to incorporation, even those granting veto power to an existing city, do not trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause because they do not burden a fundamental right to vote. By applying the rational basis test, the court makes such legislative schemes regulating municipal formation extremely difficult to challenge on constitutional grounds. This precedent gives existing cities significant leverage to control development and prevent the creation of new, potentially competitive municipalities on their borders.
