City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gaming Commission
476 Mass. 591, 71 N.E.3d 457 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
A statutory provision stating that an administrative agency has 'full discretion' and that denied applicants 'shall not be entitled to any further review' precludes ordinary judicial review under the state's Administrative Procedure Act. However, such language is not sufficiently unmistakable to preclude the extraordinary remedy of certiorari review, which remains available to correct substantial errors of law that are arbitrary or capricious.
Facts:
- In 2011, the Massachusetts Legislature enacted a law establishing expanded gaming and created the Massachusetts Gaming Commission (commission) to issue licenses.
- The commission was authorized to issue one 'category 1 license' for a casino in 'region A,' which includes the counties of Suffolk, Middlesex, Essex, Norfolk, and Worcester.
- The license application process came down to two final applicants: Wynn MA, LLC (Wynn), which proposed a casino in Everett, and Mohegan Sun Massachusetts, LLC (Mohegan Sun), which proposed a casino in Revere.
- The city of Revere was the designated 'host community' for Mohegan Sun's proposal and had a formal host community agreement in place.
- In September 2014, the commission voted to award the license to Wynn.
- In November 2014, the commission issued a formal written determination explaining its decision to award the license to Wynn and deny Mohegan Sun's application.
- Individual plaintiffs alleged that a quorum of the commission engaged in deliberations outside of public meetings, citing commissioners' calendar entries for private meetings labeled 'applicants discussion' and 'advisory groups brainstorming.'
Procedural Posture:
- The city of Revere, a labor union, and individual union members sued the Massachusetts Gaming Commission in Superior Court.
- Mohegan Sun, the unsuccessful license applicant, was permitted to intervene and file its own complaint.
- The complaints alleged numerous defects in the commission's process of awarding a gaming license to Wynn and sought judicial review, declaratory judgments, and relief under the open meeting law.
- The commission filed motions to dismiss all complaints.
- The Superior Court judge dismissed the claims of the city and the union for lack of standing and dismissed the open meeting law claim for failure to state a claim.
- The judge also dismissed Mohegan Sun's claim for review under the state Administrative Procedure Act (G. L. c. 30A), finding it was precluded by statute.
- However, the judge denied the commission's motion to dismiss Mohegan Sun's claim for certiorari review (under G. L. c. 249, § 4), allowing that claim to proceed.
- The commission (appellant) filed an interlocutory appeal of the ruling allowing certiorari review, while the original plaintiffs (appellants) appealed the dismissal of their claims.
- The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted direct appellate review of both appeals.
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Issue:
Does Massachusetts's expanded gaming act, which states that applicants for a gaming license 'shall not be entitled to any further review if denied by the commission,' preclude an unsuccessful applicant from obtaining judicial review of the licensing decision through a writ of certiorari?
Opinions:
Majority - Botsford, J.
No. A statutory provision stating that applicants 'shall not be entitled to any further review' does not preclude the extraordinary remedy of certiorari review, although it does bar ordinary judicial review under the state Administrative Procedure Act. The court reasoned that while the act's language in G. L. c. 23K, § 17(g) is sufficient to 'expressly preclude' review under the Administrative Procedure Act (G. L. c. 30A, § 14), it does not contain the 'words unmistakable in import' necessary to eliminate the ancient and extraordinary common law writ of certiorari. Preserving this limited review aligns with the act's policy objective of ensuring public confidence in the integrity of the licensing process. Mohegan Sun met the three prerequisites for certiorari review: (1) the licensing process was a quasi-judicial proceeding; (2) no other adequate remedy was available, as statutory review was precluded; and (3) Mohegan Sun suffered a substantial injury by alleging the commission deviated from the law after Mohegan Sun had invested substantially in the application process. The court established that the scope of this review is extremely deferential, limited to an 'arbitrary or capricious' standard to determine if the commission's decision was based on a legally untenable ground.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of judicial oversight for powerful administrative agencies operating under statutes that attempt to limit review. By distinguishing between ordinary statutory review (precluded) and extraordinary common law certiorari review (permitted), the court preserves a vital, albeit limited, judicial check on agency action. The ruling establishes that even when the legislature grants an agency 'full discretion' and explicitly bars 'further review,' it does not create absolute immunity from suit; agencies remain accountable for decisions that are arbitrary, capricious, or legally erroneous. This precedent will be crucial in future cases involving high-stakes licensing or regulatory decisions where statutes aim to insulate agencies from judicial scrutiny, balancing legislative intent for finality with the judiciary's inherent oversight role.
