City of Plymouth v. Longeway
818 N.W.2d 419, 296 Mich App 1 (2012)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A person "operates" a vehicle under Michigan's operating while intoxicated (OWI) statute if they are in "actual physical control" of the vehicle, which includes conscious actions like starting the engine, applying brakes, and shifting gears, even if the vehicle remains stationary and does not pose an immediate risk of collision.
Facts:
- On March 7, 2010, a doorman at a martini bar called "336" observed some females in a Pontiac G6 hit a concrete barrier when they entered the parking deck earlier in the evening.
- The doorman later alerted Officer Kevin Chumney that the females appeared to be drunk and were leaving the bar.
- Officer Chumney located the Pontiac G6, which was legally parked, and noticed its backup lights were on, and he believed the brake lights were also on.
- While Officer Chumney waited for another car to exit, the Pontiac's backup lights turned off, and it appeared the transmission was put back into park, causing the vehicle to "settle a little bit" without the tires moving.
- Officer Chumney then activated his overhead lights, blocked the car, and approached the driver's side to speak with the defendant, who was in the driver's seat, while the vehicle was still running.
- The defendant stated to Officer Chumney that she and her passengers were not leaving because they were looking for her friend's jacket.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant was charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) in the district court.
- Defendant moved to dismiss the charge in the district court, arguing she was not "operating" the vehicle as defined by law.
- The district court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that she did "operate" the vehicle.
- Defendant appealed the district court's order to the circuit court.
- The circuit court reversed the district court's decision, relying on People v Wood, and ordered that the OWI charges against the defendant be dismissed.
- The prosecution (appellant) applied for and was granted leave to appeal the circuit court's decision to the Michigan Court of Appeals (appellee is Longeway).
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a conscious, allegedly intoxicated driver "operate" a stationary vehicle, for the purpose of the OWI statute, when they start the engine, apply the brakes, shift gears from park to reverse, and then back to park, even if the vehicle does not move and is legally parked?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes, a conscious, allegedly intoxicated driver "operates" a stationary vehicle when they start the engine, apply the brakes, shift gears from park to reverse, and then back to park, because these actions establish "actual physical control" under MCL 257.35a. The court emphasized that statutory interpretation begins with the plain language, and MCL 257.35a unambiguously defines "operate" as "being in actual physical control of a vehicle." The defendant's admitted actions—starting the engine, applying brakes, and shifting gears—constituted clear instances of actual physical control over the vehicle. The court clarified that the "risk of collision" test articulated in People v Wood, which assesses whether a vehicle was in motion or posed a significant risk of causing a collision, is inapplicable to situations involving a conscious driver actively engaged in operational activity within a stationary vehicle. Instead, the Wood test is limited to contexts involving unconscious or sleeping drivers, or vehicles that are inoperable. Supporting its interpretation, the court referenced People v Yamat, which, when construing the term "operate" in another part of the Michigan Vehicle Code, relied on dictionary definitions of "actual physical control," affirming that the defendant's active manipulation of the vehicle's functions met this standard. Therefore, the fact that the vehicle remained stationary was deemed immaterial to the determination of operation given the defendant's conscious actions of control.
Analysis:
This case provides crucial clarity regarding the definition of "operating" a vehicle for OWI purposes in Michigan, significantly narrowing the application of the Wood "risk of collision" test. By reaffirming the primary importance of the statutory "actual physical control" standard for conscious drivers, the court broadens the scope of OWI liability. This ruling ensures that individuals who are intoxicated and actively manipulate a vehicle's controls (e.g., starting the engine, shifting gears), even if the vehicle does not move, can be prosecuted, reinforcing public safety by deterring pre-driving intoxicated actions.
