City of Naperville v. Watson
175 Ill.2d 399, 677 N.E.2d 955, 222 Ill. Dec. 421 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
A person is in 'actual physical control' of a vehicle for the purposes of a DUI statute if they are physically capable of operating it, regardless of their intent to put the car in motion. Using a vehicle for shelter to 'sleep off' the effects of alcohol is not a defense to a charge of being in actual physical control.
Facts:
- Ryan M. Watson consumed alcohol at a party at his home in Bolingbrook.
- Acknowledging he was too intoxicated to drive, Watson had his girlfriend, Danielle, drive his car to her friend's apartment in Naperville while he rode as a passenger.
- They arrived at the apartment complex around 12:30 a.m., with Watson planning to stay the night.
- Watson was not permitted to stay in the apartment.
- Finding it too cold to sleep in the car without heat, Watson returned to the apartment for a coat, then went back to his car.
- Around 2:30 a.m., Watson started the car's engine to run the heater for warmth.
- Watson then lay down across the front seat, with his head on the passenger's side, and fell asleep.
- At approximately 4:30 a.m., Naperville police officers discovered Watson asleep in the running vehicle.
Procedural Posture:
- The City of Naperville charged Ryan M. Watson with driving while under the influence of alcohol in violation of a municipal ordinance.
- Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Du Page County (trial court), Watson was found guilty.
- The trial court sentenced Watson to one year of court supervision and a $250 fine.
- Watson, as appellant, appealed the conviction to the Illinois Appellate Court (intermediate appellate court).
- The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The Supreme Court of Illinois allowed Watson's, as appellant's, petition for leave to appeal.
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Issue:
Does a person who is intoxicated and asleep in the driver's seat of a running vehicle, with no intent to drive, still exercise 'actual physical control' of the vehicle in violation of the DUI statute?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Nickels
Yes, a person who is intoxicated and asleep in the driver's seat of a running vehicle exercises 'actual physical control.' The Illinois Vehicle Code's prohibition on being in 'actual physical control' of a vehicle while intoxicated is a preventative measure that does not require an intent to drive. The court reasoned that the purpose of such statutes is to discourage intoxicated individuals from entering their vehicles except as passengers, as they pose a threat of immediate operation at any time. The court explicitly rejected the idea that an intoxicated person should be permitted to 'sleep it off' behind the wheel, stating that public policy encourages those who drink to arrange for lodging or safe transportation beforehand, rather than making an impaired decision to use their vehicle for shelter.
Dissenting - Justice Freeman
No, the court should not have refused to address the defendant's necessity defense based on waiver. While agreeing with the majority's interpretation of 'actual physical control,' the dissent argued that the court should have exercised its discretion to hear the necessity defense argument, which was fully briefed and argued. The dissent reasoned that Watson presented sufficient evidence to raise the affirmative defense of necessity—that he was without blame in creating the situation and chose the lesser evil (sleeping in his running car) to avoid a greater injury (driving while intoxicated or suffering from the cold). Therefore, the trial court erred by preventing the jury from hearing this defense, and the case should be remanded for a new trial where the jury could be properly instructed on necessity.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies a strict-liability interpretation of 'actual physical control' in Illinois DUI law, effectively eliminating the 'sleeping it off' defense. The court prioritizes the broad, preventative purpose of the statute over the defendant's subjective intent, even where the defendant has taken steps to avoid driving. This holding creates a bright-line rule that places the onus on individuals to plan for transportation or lodging before consuming alcohol, as using a vehicle for shelter while intoxicated is not a legally viable option. The case serves as a significant precedent that narrows potential defenses in DUI cases where the defendant is found in a non-moving vehicle.
