City of Moorpark v. Superior Court
98 Daily Journal DAR 8839, 14 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 353, 18 Cal.4th 1143 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
Labor Code section 132a, which prohibits discrimination against employees injured in the course and scope of their employment, does not provide an exclusive remedy for discrimination based on a work-related disability, thereby allowing employees to pursue remedies under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and common law wrongful discharge claims.
Facts:
- Theresa L. Dillon was employed by the City of Moorpark as an administrative secretary from May 1990 until February 28, 1994.
- Dillon recovered from knee surgery and her doctor released her to return to work.
- City Manager Steve Kueny terminated Dillon’s employment, informing her that her residual disability prevented her from performing her essential job functions.
- Dillon told Assistant City Manager Richard Hare that she could perform her job and wanted to return to work, but Hare told her she could not have her job back.
- Dillon objected in writing to Kueny regarding her termination, but to no avail.
Procedural Posture:
- Theresa L. Dillon filed a charge of disability discrimination with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing and received a right-to-sue notice.
- On February 22, 1995, Dillon sued the City of Moorpark, Steve Kueny, and Richard Hare in superior court, alleging causes of action for discrimination in violation of FEHA, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, breach of contract, and intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress.
- Defendants demurred to all causes of action, arguing that because Dillon’s disability was work related, Labor Code section 132a provided her exclusive remedy.
- The superior court overruled the demurrers to the FEHA and common law wrongful discharge causes of action, disagreeing that section 132a provided Dillon’s exclusive remedy.
- Defendants petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate, again arguing section 132a provided Dillon’s exclusive remedy.
- The Court of Appeal denied the petition, concluding that a 1993 amendment to the FEHA implicitly repealed the exclusivity aspect of section 132a.
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Issue:
Does Labor Code section 132a provide the exclusive remedy for discrimination based on a work-related disability, precluding an employee from pursuing remedies under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and common law wrongful discharge claims?
Opinions:
Majority - Chin, J.
No, Labor Code section 132a does not provide the exclusive remedy for discrimination based on a work-related disability, and therefore, an employee may pursue remedies under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and common law wrongful discharge claims. The court found that section 132a is different from other workers' compensation remedies because it addresses a breach of civil rights, not merely medical injury. The court noted that the plain language of the workers' compensation exclusive remedy provisions (Labor Code sections 3600(a) and 3602(a)) refers only to remedies within "Division 4" of the Labor Code, whereas section 132a is in "Division 1." The "compensation bargain" principle, which typically limits remedies, does not apply to employer conduct like disability discrimination because such conduct is "obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public policy and sound morality" (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance). Furthermore, Labor Code section 5300 only establishes the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board as the exclusive forum for section 132a claims, not that section 132a is the exclusive remedy. The court emphasized that the Legislature sometimes intends statutory remedies to supplement, not supplant, other remedies, citing Rojo v. Kliger and the broad, liberal construction mandated for FEHA. Finally, Labor Code section 139.6, which requires informing injured workers of their FEHA rights, supports the conclusion that section 132a is not exclusive. Disability discrimination, like sex and age discrimination, violates a "substantial and fundamental" public policy delineated in the FEHA and other statutes, thus forming a valid basis for a common law wrongful discharge claim, provided it is tethered to the FEHA's limitations, such as the ability to perform essential duties with reasonable accommodations.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Brown, J.
Yes, plaintiff Theresa L. Dillon may pursue a disability discrimination claim under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). However, no, Dillon cannot also maintain a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Justice Brown concurred with the majority that FEHA remedies are available, citing the 1993 amendment to Labor Code section 139.6, which mandates informing injured workers of their FEHA rights, thereby presupposing the existence of such rights for work-related disabilities. However, Justice Brown dissented from the majority's conclusion regarding the common law wrongful discharge claim. She reiterated her dissenting view from Stevenson v. Superior Court, arguing that the FEHA is a comprehensive statute that provides adequate administrative and judicial remedies. Allowing a parallel common law tort claim is duplicative and frustrates legislative intent, as courts should not intercede when the Legislature has already provided a sufficient statutory remedy to protect both employee and public interests.
Analysis:
This case significantly expands the avenues for relief available to employees who experience discrimination due to work-related disabilities in California. By rejecting the exclusivity of Labor Code section 132a, the court affirmed that employees can pursue more robust remedies, including compensatory and punitive damages and jury trials, under FEHA and common law. This decision ensures that disability discrimination, even if work-related, is treated with the same gravity as other forms of discrimination (e.g., race, sex) and cannot be insulated by the workers' compensation system's limitations. It reinforces the principle that public policy violations that are "obnoxious to the interests of the state" fall outside the workers' compensation bargain, providing a stronger deterrent against employer misconduct.
