City of Milwaukee v. Illinois

Supreme Court of the United States
451 U.S. 304, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 22, 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981)

ELI5:

Sections

Rule of Law:

Federal statutory law displaces federal common law when Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme that addresses the specific problem previously governed by common law.

Facts:

The City of Milwaukee and its sewerage commissions operate sewer systems and treatment plants that discharge effluent into Lake Michigan.
The sewer system includes both separated sewers and combined sewers; the latter carry both sewage and storm water in the same pipes.
During wet weather events, the system often exceeds capacity, causing overflows that discharge untreated sewage directly into Lake Michigan and its tributaries.
These discharges contain pathogens (viruses and bacteria) and nutrients that are transported by lake currents into Illinois waters.
Illinois claimed these discharges constituted a threat to the health of its citizens and accelerated the eutrophication of the lake.
Following an earlier Supreme Court decision (Milwaukee I), Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, establishing a comprehensive permit system.
Milwaukee received discharge permits from the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (under EPA oversight) which set specific effluent limitations and requirements for addressing overflows.
Illinois believed these permit standards were insufficient to protect its residents and sought stricter controls.

Procedural Posture:

Illinois filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois seeking abatement of the nuisance under federal common law.
The District Court entered a judgment for Illinois, finding a nuisance existed and ordering Milwaukee to eliminate overflows and meet effluent limitations stricter than those in their permits.
Milwaukee appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed that the 1972 Act did not preempt federal common law but reversed regarding the specific treated sewage limitations while upholding the overflow elimination orders.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the determination.

Premium Content

Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief

You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture

Issue:

Does the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act) displace the federal common law of nuisance regarding interstate water pollution, thereby precluding federal courts from imposing stricter effluent standards than those required by the Act?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Rehnquist

Yes. The Court held that the comprehensive regulatory scheme established by the 1972 Amendments effectively displaces federal common law regarding interstate water pollution. Federal common law is a 'necessary expedient' utilized by courts only when Congress has not spoken to a particular issue. However, when Congress addresses a question previously governed by federal common law, the need for judicial lawmaking disappears. The Court found that the 1972 Act was an 'all-encompassing program of water pollution regulation' where Congress occupied the field through expert administrative agencies. Because the Act specifically addressed the issuance of permits and effluent limitations—the exact issues Illinois sought to litigate—there was no 'interstice' or gap for the federal courts to fill with common law. The Court rejected the argument that the 'savings clause' in Section 505(e) preserved the right to sue under federal common law, interpreting it instead to preserve only other specific statutory or state law remedies.

Dissenting - Justice Blackmun

No. The dissent argued that Congress did not intend to extinguish the federal common law of nuisance when passing the 1972 Amendments. Justice Blackmun emphasized that federal common law serves a unique role in resolving interstate disputes and that the legislative history and text of the Act supported its preservation. Specifically, the dissent pointed to Section 505(e), which states that nothing in the citizen-suit section restricts rights under 'any statute or common law.' The dissent argued that the Act sets minimum standards but should not prevent federal courts from using common law to protect a state from a neighbor's pollution, maintaining that the comprehensive nature of a statute does not automatically imply the elimination of other legal remedies.

Analysis:

This decision marks a significant limitation on the scope of federal common law, strictly defining it as a gap-filling measure that yields immediately to Congressional action. By ruling that the Clean Water Act displaced federal common law nuisance claims, the Court reinforced the separation of powers, asserting that environmental policy-making belongs to the legislature and expert agencies rather than the judiciary. This effectively ended the use of federal nuisance suits as a tool for states to force stricter pollution controls on neighboring states, funneling such disputes instead through the regulatory permit process and administrative appeals. It establishes a high bar for the survival of federal common law once a federal statute covers the general subject matter.

Gunnerbot

AI-powered case assistant

Loaded: City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (1981)

Try: "What was the holding?" or "Explain the dissent"