City of Miami v. McGrath
27 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 667, 2002 Fla. LEXIS 1479, 824 So. 2d 143 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
A state law authorizing a local government to impose a non-ad valorem tax constitutes an unconstitutional special law if its classification scheme is based on a population threshold tied to a fixed, past date, thereby creating a permanently closed class that excludes other entities from ever qualifying.
Facts:
- In 1999, the Florida Legislature enacted section 218.503(5)(a), authorizing certain municipalities to impose a surcharge of up to 20 percent on parking facilities.
- The statute's eligibility was limited to municipalities with a resident population of 300,000 or more as of April 1, 1999.
- The statute also required that an eligible municipality had been declared in a state of financial emergency within the previous two fiscal years.
- The statute was passed by the legislature on April 30, 1999, and became effective on July 1, 1999, after the April 1, 1999 classification date had already passed.
- This fixed date permanently limited the class of potentially eligible municipalities to Miami, Tampa, and Jacksonville.
- In July 1999, the City of Miami enacted an ordinance to levy the parking tax authorized by the statute, which became effective September 1, 1999.
Procedural Posture:
- Patrick McGrath III filed a complaint against the City of Miami in a state trial court, challenging the constitutionality of the city's parking tax ordinance and the enabling statute.
- Miami-Dade County and its employee, Laureen Varga, intervened as plaintiffs.
- Both the City and McGrath filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Miami, upholding the statute's constitutionality.
- McGrath, as appellant, appealed the trial court's decision to the Florida Third District Court of Appeal.
- The Third District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the state statute was an unconstitutional special law.
- The City of Miami, as appellant, appealed the Third District's decision to the Supreme Court of Florida.
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Issue:
Does a state statute, which authorizes the imposition of a non-ad valorem tax, constitute an unconstitutional special law under the Florida Constitution when it restricts its application to only those municipalities that met a specific population threshold by a fixed date that has already passed?
Opinions:
Majority - Pariente, J.
Yes. A statute authorizing a non-ad valorem tax that applies only to municipalities meeting a population threshold by a fixed past date is an unconstitutional special law. The Florida Constitution requires that non-ad valorem taxes be authorized only by general law, not special law. A general law must apply uniformly within a permissible classification, and the classification must be open to future members. By anchoring the 300,000-population requirement to the date of April 1, 1999—a date that had already passed when the law was enacted—the legislature created a permanently closed class. This 'descriptive technique' is functionally equivalent to naming the specific municipalities (Miami, Tampa, and Jacksonville), making it a special law. Citing precedent from cases like Fort v. Dekle and Department of Bus. Regulation v. Classic Mile, Inc., the court concluded that a statutory classification incapable of generic application and fixed to preclude future inclusion is arbitrary and therefore invalid.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms and strengthens the constitutional prohibition against special laws disguised as general laws, particularly in the realm of local taxation. The court makes it clear that using a fixed, past date to define a population-based class is a per se arbitrary classification, as it prevents the uniform application of the law to similarly situated entities that may meet the criteria in the future. This ruling serves as a significant check on the legislature's ability to enact laws that benefit specific localities under the guise of general applicability. It reinforces the 'open class' doctrine, requiring that classifications in general laws remain potentially accessible to other entities over time.
