City of Memphis v. Greene
451 U.S. 100, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 87, 67 L. Ed. 2d 769 (1981)
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Rule of Law:
A municipal action that has a disproportionate adverse impact on a racial minority does not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1982 or the Thirteenth Amendment if it is motivated by legitimate, non-pretextual governmental interests and does not tangibly impair property rights, such as by diminishing value or severely restricting access.
Facts:
- Hein Park, a historically all-white residential neighborhood in Memphis, Tennessee, is situated just south of a predominantly black neighborhood.
- West Drive, a two-lane street, runs through Hein Park and served as a thoroughfare for traffic from the northern, predominantly black community to areas south of Hein Park.
- Residents of Hein Park perceived the traffic from the northern community as excessive, fast, and dangerous to children, and also complained of noise and litter.
- In 1973, after a prior request was denied, the Hein Park Civic Association formally applied to the city to close the north end of West Drive.
- The stated reasons for the closing were to reduce the flow of through traffic, increase safety for children, and reduce 'traffic pollution' like noise and litter.
- The Memphis City Council, after public hearings where both proponents and opponents presented their views, adopted a resolution authorizing the closing of the street.
Procedural Posture:
- Residents of a predominantly black neighborhood sued the City of Memphis in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, seeking to enjoin the street closing.
- The District Court granted the city's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
- The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for trial, holding that if the plaintiffs proved racial motivation for the closing, they would have a valid claim.
- After a full trial, the District Court found no racially discriminatory intent and entered judgment for the City of Memphis.
- The plaintiffs again appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court a second time, holding that the street closing was a 'badge of slavery' that violated § 1982 regardless of the city's intent.
- The City of Memphis successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a city's decision to close a public street, which disproportionately inconveniences black residents, violate 42 U.S.C. § 1982 or the Thirteenth Amendment when the decision is motivated by legitimate safety and tranquility interests and does not diminish black-owned property values or severely restrict access to homes?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
No. A city's decision to close a public street for legitimate traffic management and safety reasons does not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1982 or the Thirteenth Amendment, even if it has a disproportionate racial impact, so long as it does not impair a cognizable property right. The Court found that the injury to respondents was not a deprivation of property rights protected by § 1982, but rather a mere inconvenience requiring motorists to use an alternative route that was not significantly longer. The record did not support the claim that the closing would depreciate the value of property owned by black citizens or severely restrict their access to their homes. Regarding the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court held that the street closing was motivated by legitimate governmental interests in safety and residential tranquility, not by racial animus. The resulting inconvenience is a routine burden of citizenship and cannot be equated with a 'badge of slavery,' which would trivialize the amendment's great purpose.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
Yes. The city's action violates both 42 U.S.C. § 1982 and the Thirteenth Amendment by erecting a barrier that carves out a racial enclave and sends a powerful symbolic message of exclusion. The dissent argues that the majority mischaracterizes the harm as a 'slight inconvenience' when it is in fact a significant psychological injury and a 'monument to racial hostility.' There was substantial evidence of discriminatory intent under the Arlington Heights framework, including procedural irregularities, the historical context of segregation, and the use of 'undesirable traffic' as a code phrase for racial discrimination. This harm impairs respondents' right to 'hold' and enjoy their property under § 1982. The dissent concludes that erecting a barrier at the behest of a white community to keep out predominantly black traffic is a 'badge of slavery' prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment, and the city's proffered justifications are insufficient to overcome this constitutional violation.
Concurring - Justice White
No. The judgment should be reversed because a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 requires proof of a racially discriminatory purpose, which the District Court found was not present. The majority erred by acting as a factfinder and re-evaluating the record instead of addressing the central legal question presented: whether § 1982 requires a showing of intent. An analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 reveals that Congress was concerned with eradicating direct, intentional abuses and blatant deprivations of civil rights, not with facially neutral measures that have an incidental disparate impact. Because the Court of Appeals reversed without disturbing the trial court's finding of no discriminatory purpose, it applied the wrong legal standard, and its judgment must be reversed on that basis alone.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrowed the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 in cases involving municipal actions with a disparate racial impact. By requiring plaintiffs to show either discriminatory intent or a direct, tangible impairment of a property right (like diminished value or severely restricted access), the Court made it more difficult to challenge facially neutral policies that perpetuate de facto segregation. The ruling distinguishes between mere inconvenience, which is not legally actionable under § 1982, and a cognizable interference with property interests. This precedent requires lower courts to scrutinize the nature and severity of the harm alleged in racial discrimination claims involving public services and infrastructure.
