City of Los Angeles Department of Water v. Manhart

Supreme Court of the United States
435 U.S. 702, 55 L. Ed. 2d 657, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 23 (1978)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from requiring female employees to make larger contributions to a pension fund than male employees. Even if based on statistically valid, sex-based actuarial tables, such a practice constitutes unlawful sex discrimination because the statute protects individuals rather than classes.


Facts:

  • The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power administered a retirement, disability, and death-benefit program for its employees.
  • The pension plan required contributions from both the Department and its employees.
  • Based on mortality tables indicating that women, on average, live longer than men, the Department required its female employees to make monthly contributions to the pension fund that were 14.84% higher than those required of male employees.
  • Because contributions were withheld from paychecks, a female employee took home less pay than a male employee earning the same salary.
  • Despite the difference in contributions, the monthly retirement benefits paid out to men and women of the same age, seniority, and salary were equal.

Procedural Posture:

  • Female employees of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (respondents) brought a class-action suit against the Department (petitioners) in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.
  • The District Court granted summary judgment for the female employees, holding that the contribution differential violated Title VII.
  • The District Court ordered an injunction and a refund of all excess contributions made by female employees.
  • The Department appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
  • The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling.
  • The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Ninth Circuit.

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Issue:

Does an employer's requirement that female employees make larger contributions to a pension fund than male employees, based on actuarial tables showing that women as a class live longer than men, violate § 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?


Opinions:

Majority - Justice Stevens

Yes. Requiring female employees to make larger pension contributions than male employees violates § 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The statute's focus is on the individual, and it prohibits treating an individual as a mere component of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class. Even a true generalization about a class, such as women's greater longevity, is an insufficient reason to treat individual members of that class differently. The practice is discriminatory on its face because it treats a person differently 'but for that person's sex.' The differential is not protected by the Equal Pay Act's exception for a 'factor other than sex,' because the distinction is based explicitly on sex, not on longevity as an individualized factor. Finally, this case is distinct from General Electric Co. v. Gilbert because here the plan facially discriminates between men and women, whereas the plan in Gilbert discriminated between pregnant persons and non-pregnant persons, a group which includes both sexes.


Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Chief Justice Burger

No. The Department's practice does not violate Title VII because it falls under the exemption for a 'differential based on any other factor other than sex,' incorporated from the Equal Pay Act. That other factor is longevity, a statistically sound and proven disparity between men and women that is rational for employers to rely on for group pension programs. It is not a failure to treat women as individuals, but rather to treat them as individually as possible when the actual length of each person's life is unknowable. Congress did not intend for Title VII to cause such a revolutionary change in the pension industry without a clear statement of that purpose.


Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Marshall

Yes. The Court is correct that the contribution differential violates Title VII. However, the Court is wrong to deny retroactive relief. Under the precedent set in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, there is a strong presumption in favor of retroactive liability to make victims of discrimination whole. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a refund of the excess contributions, and there is no evidence that doing so would have threatened the pension plan's solvency or unduly harmed innocent third parties. The Court should have affirmed the lower court's judgment in its entirety.


Concurring - Justice Blackmun

Yes. While concurring in the judgment that the practice is unlawful, the reasoning is difficult to reconcile with the Court's prior decisions in Geduldig and General Electric. Those cases might have suggested that a distinction based on the objective, non-stigmatizing factor of life expectancy would be permissible. The majority's attempt to distinguish General Electric is 'just too easy' and not based on a principled distinction. Therefore, today's decision effectively 'cuts back' on those precedents, and the Court should have addressed that conflict head-on rather than through a 'thin rationalization'.



Analysis:

This landmark decision established that Title VII's focus on the individual prohibits employment practices based on even statistically accurate generalizations about a protected class. It explicitly rejected a cost-justification defense for sex discrimination, clarifying that an employer cannot justify unequal take-home pay for women by pointing to the higher aggregate cost of their pension benefits. The case significantly impacted the insurance and pension industries by requiring gender-neutral contributions and benefits in employer-operated plans. It also narrowed the interpretation of the Equal Pay Act's 'factor other than sex' defense, holding it cannot be used when sex itself is the explicit basis for the differential.

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