City of Ladue v. Gilleo

United States Supreme Court
512 U.S. 43 (1994)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A municipal ordinance that almost completely bans all residential signs violates the First Amendment's protection of free speech because it forecloses a venerable and important medium of communication for which no adequate substitutes exist.

Facts:

The City of Ladue, Missouri, enacted an ordinance prohibiting homeowners from displaying any signs on their property, with few exceptions for things like 'residence identification' and 'for sale' signs.
Margaret P. Gilleo, a resident of Ladue, placed a 24- by 36-inch sign on her front lawn stating, 'Say No to War in the Persian Gulf, Call Congress Now.'
After Gilleo's first sign disappeared, she put up a replacement, which was subsequently knocked down.
When Gilleo reported these events to the police, she was advised that such signs were prohibited by the city's ordinance.
The Ladue City Council denied Gilleo's petition for a variance to allow her to display the sign.
Gilleo later placed a smaller 8.5- by 11-inch sign in her second-story window stating, 'For Peace in the Gulf.'
In response to litigation, the City of Ladue repealed its ordinance and enacted a new, similar ordinance which explicitly prohibited window signs like Gilleo's.

Procedural Posture:

Margaret P. Gilleo filed suit against the City of Ladue in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, alleging the city's sign ordinance violated her First Amendment rights.
The District Court issued a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance.
After Gilleo amended her complaint to challenge a newly enacted ordinance, the District Court held that ordinance unconstitutional.
The City of Ladue appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's ruling, holding the ordinance was an invalid content-based regulation.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted the City of Ladue's petition for certiorari.

Premium Content

Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief

You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture

Issue:

Does a city ordinance that bans the display of nearly all signs on residential property, with limited exceptions, violate a resident's First Amendment right to freedom of speech?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Stevens

Yes. A municipal ordinance that prohibits a homeowner from displaying a sign on her own property violates the First Amendment because it eliminates a unique, important, and traditional medium of expression for which there are no adequate alternatives. The Court chose not to decide the case on the grounds that the ordinance's exemptions constituted impermissible content discrimination. Instead, it focused on the broader issue that the ordinance simply prohibits too much protected speech. Residential signs are a venerable and highly effective medium for communicating personal, political, and religious messages. They are unique because they identify the speaker with her home, conveying a powerful message about her personal conviction. This form of speech is also unusually cheap and convenient, making it accessible to individuals of modest means. The alternatives suggested by the City—such as handbills, bumper stickers, and newspaper ads—are not adequate substitutes because they fail to convey the same message, may be more costly or less convenient, and may not reach the intended audience of neighbors. While the City's interest in aesthetics and preventing 'visual clutter' is legitimate, it is not sufficient to justify such a sweeping ban on an entire medium of expression, particularly given the special solicitude for individual liberty and speech within the home.

Concurring - Justice O'Connor

Yes. While agreeing with the Court's conclusion that the ordinance is unconstitutional, this opinion argues the Court should have followed the standard First Amendment analytical framework. The proper first step is to determine whether the regulation is content-based. Here, the ordinance is clearly content-based because its exemptions—allowing 'for sale' signs but not political signs—discriminate based on the message. Such content-based restrictions are presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny. By assuming arguendo that the ordinance was content-neutral and deciding the case on the grounds that it banned 'too much' speech, the majority took an unusual and less direct route. Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor joins the majority's opinion because its conclusion is correct and it does not foreclose the use of the proper content-discrimination inquiry in future cases.

Analysis:

This decision solidifies the constitutional protection afforded to residential signs as a unique and historically important medium of expression. The Court's analysis establishes that a law can be unconstitutional not just for discriminating based on content, but also for being overly broad by closing off an entire channel of communication without leaving adequate alternatives. This 'prohibits too much speech' rationale provides a distinct avenue for challenging regulations that might otherwise be defended as content-neutral. The ruling significantly curtails the ability of municipalities to enact broad aesthetic zoning regulations that impinge on noncommercial speech, reinforcing the principle that speech from one's own home receives heightened First Amendment protection.

Gunnerbot

AI-powered case assistant

Loaded: City of Ladue v. Gilleo (1994)

Try: "What was the holding?" or "Explain the dissent"