City of Houston v. Hill
482 U.S. 451, 96 L. Ed. 2d 398, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 2617 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
A statute that makes it unlawful to verbally interrupt a police officer in the performance of their duty is unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment if it is not narrowly tailored to prohibit only unprotected speech such as 'fighting words.'
Facts:
- Raymond Wayne Hill was a resident of Houston, Texas, and an activist affiliated with several local political and human rights groups.
- On February 14, 1982, Hill observed his friend, Charles Hill, intentionally stopping traffic on a street.
- Two Houston police officers approached Charles Hill and began speaking with him.
- In an attempt to divert the officers' attention from his friend, Raymond Hill shouted at the officers, "Why don’t you pick on somebody your own size?"
- When one officer asked if he was interrupting an officer in his official capacity, Hill replied, "Yes, why don’t you pick on somebody my size?"
- Hill was arrested under Houston Code of Ordinances, §34-11(a), which made it a crime to interrupt a police officer.
- The ordinance, in its enforceable portion, made it unlawful to "in any manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman in the execution of his duty."
- Over the years, Hill had been arrested four times under this ordinance but was never convicted.
Procedural Posture:
- Raymond Hill was tried and acquitted of the criminal charge in Houston Municipal Court.
- Hill then filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas against the City of Houston, seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutional.
- The District Court ruled in favor of the City of Houston, holding that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
- Hill, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
- A three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court, finding the ordinance was substantially overbroad.
- The Fifth Circuit then reheard the case en banc and affirmed the panel's judgment.
- The City of Houston, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a municipal ordinance that makes it unlawful for any person to 'in any manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman in the execution of his duty' violate the First Amendment because it is unconstitutionally overbroad?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Brennan
Yes. A municipal ordinance that criminalizes interrupting a police officer in the execution of their duty is unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment. The enforceable portion of the ordinance deals with speech, not core criminal conduct, as its prohibitions on physical assault are pre-empted by Texas state law. The First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenges directed at police officers. This ordinance is not limited to unprotected 'fighting words,' and in fact, police officers are expected to exercise a higher degree of restraint than ordinary citizens when confronted with provocative speech. The ordinance's sweeping language criminalizes a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech and provides police with unfettered discretion to arrest individuals for words that annoy or offend them, which is impermissible. Furthermore, because the ordinance's language is plain and not susceptible to a limiting construction, federal court abstention is inappropriate.
Concurring - Justice Blackmun
I join the Court's judgment, but I do not agree with its reliance on Gooding v. Wilson and Lewis v. City of New Orleans. I dissented in those cases because I believed the statutes at issue concerned 'fighting words.' The Houston ordinance, however, is far broader and more clearly offensive to First Amendment values than the statutes in those cases, as it is susceptible of regular application to protected expression.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
I concur in the judgment. I join Part II of Justice Powell's opinion, agreeing that abstention is inappropriate. I also join Part III of Justice Powell's opinion regarding the unconstitutionality of the ordinance on its merits.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Powell
I concur that the ordinance is unconstitutional but dissent from the majority's reasoning and its decision not to certify the question to the state courts. The Court should have first certified the case to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to provide an authoritative construction of the ordinance's intent requirement, which might have narrowed the constitutional issue. While Pullman abstention is inappropriate, the majority's reasoning on the merits is flawed. The ordinance applies to conduct as well as speech, and not all verbal challenges to police are protected. However, the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because its ambiguous terms grant police 'a virtually unrestrained power to arrest' and it has been applied to constitutionally protected activity like 'Talking' or 'Refusing to remain silent.'
Dissenting - Chief Justice Rehnquist
I join Parts I and II of Justice Powell's opinion regarding certification and abstention. However, I do not agree that the Houston ordinance is unconstitutional in the absence of an authoritative construction by the Texas courts and therefore dissent from the Court's judgment.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a significant First Amendment protection for speech directed at police officers. It clarifies that laws criminalizing interference with police must be narrowly tailored and cannot broadly prohibit verbal interruptions or challenges. By striking down the ordinance as facially overbroad, the Court reinforced the principle that citizens have a right to question and criticize police, distinguishing a free society from a police state. This precedent makes it very difficult for municipalities to maintain vague or sweeping ordinances that could be used to suppress criticism of law enforcement, thereby limiting police discretion to arrest individuals for their speech.
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