City of Ft. Myers v. Splitt
988 So.2d 28, 2008 WL 2554400 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
When challenging a quasi-judicial zoning ordinance on grounds other than its inconsistency with a comprehensive plan, a plaintiff must have standing by demonstrating "special damages" that differ in kind, not merely degree, from those suffered by the community as a whole.
Facts:
- Virginia Splitt and several citizens' associations (Splitt et al.) opposed a proposed planned unit development (PUD) for a multiuse project known as "The Vue" on riverfront land adjacent to a public park.
- During city proceedings, Splitt expressed concern that a tree planted in the park in her husband's memory might be moved and that public park land would be turned over to private enterprise.
- The Caloosahatchee River Citizens Association worried that future condominium residents would complain about noise and traffic from festivals held in the park, diminishing its public enjoyment.
- The Responsible Growth Management Coalition objected to the size of the PUD and the need for city garbage trucks to use access roads for trash pickup.
- The City of Fort Myers adopted ordinance 3366, which approved the PUD project.
- Splitt et al.'s challenge to the ordinance focused on its alleged non-compliance with the City's specific PUD criteria and zoning requirements, not its consistency with the city's comprehensive plan.
Procedural Posture:
- Virginia Splitt and several citizens' associations (Splitt et al.) participated in quasi-judicial proceedings before the City of Fort Myers to oppose a planned unit development.
- The City of Fort Myers adopted ordinance 3366, approving the development.
- Splitt et al. filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the circuit court (the court of first instance for this type of review) to challenge the ordinance.
- Splitt et al. also filed a declaratory judgment action alleging the ordinance was inconsistent with the City's comprehensive plan, but later voluntarily dismissed that separate action.
- In the circuit court, the City of Fort Myers argued that Splitt et al. lacked standing under the 'special damages' test from Renard v. Dade County.
- The circuit court, acting in its appellate capacity, ruled that the more liberal standing standard from section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, applied and granted the petition, quashing the city ordinance.
- The City of Fort Myers (Petitioner) then petitioned the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, for a writ of certiorari to review the circuit court's decision, with Splitt et al. as Respondents.
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Issue:
Does the liberal standing requirement of section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, which governs challenges to the consistency of a development order with a comprehensive plan, apply to a certiorari challenge of a quasi-judicial zoning ordinance when the comprehensive plan consistency claim has been abandoned?
Opinions:
Majority - Canady, Judge
No. The liberal standing requirement of section 163.3215 applies only to de novo actions challenging the consistency of a development order with a local government's comprehensive plan. For other certiorari challenges to quasi-judicial zoning decisions, the stricter 'special damages' standing test from Renard v. Dade County applies. The court reasoned that there are two distinct standards for standing in zoning challenges. The Renard standard requires a showing of 'special damages' that are 'differing in kind' from the harm suffered by the general public, a test derived from public nuisance law. In contrast, section 163.3215 was enacted to liberalize standing specifically for comprehensive plan challenges, requiring only an adverse effect that 'exceeds in degree' the general community interest. Because Splitt et al. voluntarily dismissed their claim that the ordinance was inconsistent with the City's comprehensive plan, they were foreclosed from using the more liberal statutory standing test. Therefore, the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law by applying the section 163.3215 standard instead of the controlling Renard standard. The court also noted that standing in a certiorari proceeding must be established from the record of the proceedings before the local government, not from new allegations in the court petition.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the critical distinction between different types of zoning challenges and their corresponding standing requirements in Florida. It clarifies that plaintiffs cannot benefit from the liberal statutory standing for comprehensive plan challenges if they are actually arguing about compliance with other zoning ordinances. This ruling emphasizes the importance for litigants to choose their legal theory carefully, as it directly impacts their ability to even bring a case. It also underscores the procedural rule that in certiorari review, the facts supporting standing must be present in the underlying administrative record, not introduced for the first time on appeal.
