City of El Cenizo, Texas v. State of Texas
890 F. 3d 164 (2018)
Rule of Law:
A state law requiring local governmental entities and officers to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement and honor ICE detainer requests is generally constitutional and not preempted by federal law, nor does it violate the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments, but a provision broadly prohibiting elected officials from "endorsing" policies limiting immigration enforcement may violate the First Amendment.
Facts:
- In May 2017, the Texas Legislature enacted Senate Bill 4 (SB4) to prohibit "sanctuary city" policies throughout the state.
- SB4 forbids local entities from adopting, enforcing, or endorsing policies that prohibit or materially limit immigration enforcement activities, including inquiring into immigration status of lawfully detained individuals, sharing immigration-status information with federal agencies, and assisting federal immigration officers.
- SB4 requires law enforcement agencies to comply with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainer requests for individuals in custody, and to inform the person they are being held pursuant to such a request.
- Current ICE policy requires detainer requests (Form I-247A) to be accompanied by a signed administrative warrant, attesting to probable cause that the subject is a removable alien.
- SB4 includes an exception to the detainer mandate if the individual provides proof of U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status, such as a Texas driver’s license.
- SB4 imposes civil penalties on local entities (fines) and criminal penalties on public officers (removal from office, misdemeanor) for violations.
- Prior to SB4's enactment, the Maverick County Sheriff’s Office had a policy under which it did "not participate or cooperate in the arrests of individuals for civil immigration violations."
- The Mayor of El Cenizo contended that the city's policy "limits the situations in which [city] . . . officials engage in immigration enforcement or collect and disseminate such information."
Procedural Posture:
- Before SB4 went into effect, several Texas cities, counties, local law-enforcement and city officials, and advocacy groups (plaintiffs) challenged the law in three consolidated actions in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
- The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against SB4.
- The district court found the plaintiffs likely to prevail on several claims and issued a preliminary injunction enjoining: Section 752.053(b)(3)'s assistance-cooperation provision (field and conflict preempted); Section 752.053(a)(1)'s "endorse" prohibition (First and Fourteenth Amendments - overbroad, viewpoint discrimination, vague); Section 752.053(a)(1) and (a)(2)'s "materially limits" prohibitions (Fourteenth Amendment - vague); and Article 2.251’s ICE-detainer mandate (Fourth Amendment violation).
- The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims that SB4 was preempted more generally.
- Texas (defendants) moved the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to stay the injunction pending appeal.
- A Fifth Circuit stay panel granted the motion in part, finding Texas likely to prevail on the Fourth Amendment and preemption claims, and stayed the injunction as to article 2.251’s ICE-detainer mandate and Section 752.053(b)(3)’s assistance-cooperation provision.
- The stay panel left the injunction in place as to the “endorse” and the “materially limits” prohibitions.
- Texas appealed the preliminary injunction, and the plaintiffs cross-appealed the district court’s refusal to enjoin SB4 completely.
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Issue:
Does Texas Senate Bill 4, which forbids "sanctuary city" policies and mandates local cooperation with federal immigration enforcement, violate the U.S. Constitution by (1) being preempted by federal immigration law, (2) violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments through its "endorse" prohibition, (3) violating the Fourth Amendment through its ICE-detainer mandate, or (4) being unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment with the phrase "materially limits"?
Opinions:
Majority - Edith H. Jones
No, with one exception. SB4's provisions generally do not, on their face, violate the U.S. Constitution, except for the application of the "endorse" prohibition, Tex. Gov't Code § 752.053(a)(1), to elected officials. The court found no field preemption because federal law regulates how local entities may cooperate in immigration enforcement, while SB4 specifies whether they cooperate, and Congress has not expressed a clear and manifest purpose to preclude state regulation in this specific field. Conflict preemption was also rejected; SB4's assistance-cooperation provision requires a predicate federal request, aligning with 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(B)'s savings clause allowing cooperation without 287(g) agreements. The status-inquiry and information-sharing provisions are consistent with `Arizona v. United States` and `Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting`, which upheld similar state laws and acknowledged Congress's encouragement of information sharing. The court recognized the Tenth Amendment prevents Congress from compelling local entities to enforce immigration law, thus precluding an implied federal purpose for voluntary local cooperation that SB4 would conflict with. However, the court affirmed the injunction against the "endorse" prohibition as applied to elected officials. It concluded that the term "endorse" was not "readily susceptible" to Texas's proposed narrowing construction of "sanction" (official authorization) without rendering it superfluous or meaningless in the context of "adopt" and "enforce." As broadly interpreted, "endorse" proscribes core political speech by elected officials, which is protected by the First Amendment and cannot pass strict scrutiny. The court reversed the injunction against the ICE-detainer mandate, holding it does not violate the Fourth Amendment on its face. Current ICE policy requires detainer requests to be accompanied by an administrative warrant attesting to probable cause of removability, and under the collective-knowledge doctrine, this probable cause is imputed to local officers. The court rejected the argument that probable cause of criminality is required for all seizures in this context, noting the civil nature of removal proceedings. The mandate's exception in subsection (b) for proof of lawful status adequately addresses probable cause concerns and does not require local officers to make unilateral removability determinations, distinguishing it from `Arizona` and `Farmers Branch`. Finally, the court reversed the injunction against the "materially limits" phrase, finding it not facially vague. The adjacent specific provisions in SB4 (status-inquiry, information-sharing, assistance-cooperation) provide context, and materiality standards are routine in law and understood by law enforcement/government officers. The inclusion of both "prohibits" and "materially limits" addresses policies that are not outright bans but significant restrictions.
Analysis:
This case significantly affirms a state's broad power to compel its local governmental entities and officers to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement, even without formal federal agreements like 287(g) programs. It clarifies that such state mandates are generally not preempted by federal law and typically survive Fourth Amendment facial challenges, so long as federal requests are backed by probable cause. However, the ruling also sets an important First Amendment boundary, protecting the core political speech of elected officials from state laws that would broadly restrict their ability to "endorse" policies, even if those policies are contrary to state law. This distinction between elected officials and other government employees or entities will be critical for future challenges to similar state-level mandates, particularly in determining whose speech is considered "government speech" versus protected individual expression.
