City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
Legislation that distinguishes between individuals with intellectual disabilities and others is subject to rational basis review and will be struck down as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause if the classification is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose, but is instead based on irrational prejudice.
Facts:
- Jan Hannah purchased a building in the city of Cleburne, Texas, with the intention of leasing it to Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) to operate a group home.
- The home was planned to house 13 individuals with intellectual disabilities under the constant supervision of CLC staff members.
- The property was located in an area zoned as an 'Apartment House District,' which permitted uses like apartment houses, boarding houses, fraternity houses, and nursing homes for the aged without a special permit.
- A city ordinance required a special use permit, renewable annually, for the operation of '[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded, or alcoholic [sic] or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions.'
- The city of Cleburne informed CLC that its proposed group home was classified as a 'hospital for the feeble-minded' and would require this special use permit.
- After CLC applied for the permit and a public hearing was held, the Cleburne City Council voted to deny the special use permit.
Procedural Posture:
- Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) sued the City of Cleburne in the U.S. District Court, alleging the zoning ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause.
- The District Court, a court of first instance, applied rational basis review and ruled in favor of the City, holding the ordinance was constitutional.
- CLC, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
- The Fifth Circuit, an intermediate appellate court, reversed the District Court. It held that intellectual disability is a quasi-suspect classification requiring intermediate scrutiny and found the ordinance unconstitutional on its face and as applied.
- The City of Cleburne, as petitioner, sought a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does a municipal zoning ordinance that requires a special use permit for a group home for individuals with intellectual disabilities, but not for other similar multi-unit residences, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice White
Yes, the ordinance is unconstitutional as applied in this case. Classifications based on intellectual disability are not quasi-suspect and thus are subject to rational basis review, not heightened scrutiny. The Court rejects heightened scrutiny because individuals with intellectual disabilities have reduced abilities relevant to legitimate state interests, recent legislation on their behalf belies a continuing animus and shows they are not politically powerless, and granting them quasi-suspect status would create a slippery slope for other groups. However, even under rational basis review, the ordinance fails as applied to this home. The city's stated justifications—including the negative attitudes of neighbors, fears of harassment from students at a nearby school, concerns about its location on a flood plain, and the number of occupants—are not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. These concerns are either based on irrational prejudice or would apply equally to other uses that are permitted without a special permit, revealing that the true basis for the distinction is an impermissible animus towards individuals with intellectual disabilities.
Concurring - Justice Stevens
Yes, the ordinance is unconstitutional. The Court's rigid, multi-tiered approach to equal protection analysis is flawed; a single, more flexible 'rational basis' standard should apply to all classifications. This standard would require that an impartial lawmaker could logically believe the classification serves a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the disadvantaged class. In this case, the permit requirement was not based on any legitimate public purpose, such as protecting the residents or the community, but rather on the irrational fears of neighboring property owners. Therefore, the discriminatory application of the ordinance is not rational and violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Concurring - Justice Marshall
Yes, the ordinance is unconstitutional, but the Court's reasoning and remedy are flawed. The Court purports to apply rational basis review but actually engages in the kind of searching inquiry characteristic of heightened scrutiny. Given the long and tragic history of grotesque discrimination against individuals with intellectual disabilities and the substantial interest in establishing a home, heightened scrutiny should be explicitly applied. I dissent from the Court's decision to invalidate the ordinance only 'as applied.' This remedy is a novel and unwise departure from precedent; because the ordinance rests on irrational prejudice and overbroad generalizations, it should be invalidated on its face to prevent future discriminatory applications and provide clear guidance.
Analysis:
This case is significant for creating what is often called 'rational basis with bite.' While the Court formally declined to designate intellectual disability as a quasi-suspect classification, it applied a more rigorous and searching form of rational basis review than is typical for economic or social legislation. The decision signals that even under the most deferential standard of review, laws motivated by animus or irrational prejudice against a particular group will not survive an Equal Protection challenge. This provides a path for courts to strike down discriminatory laws without formally creating a new protected class, but it also creates some ambiguity about when this more stringent form of rational basis review should be applied.
