City of Chicago v. Jefferson B. Sessions III
888 F.3d 272 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
The Executive Branch, through the Attorney General, may not impose conditions on federal grants to state and local governments without clear and express authorization from Congress. A catch-all statutory provision describing potential powers does not constitute such an authorization, and imposing conditions without it violates the constitutional separation of powers.
Facts:
- The City of Chicago enacted a "Welcoming City Ordinance" which limits cooperation between city employees and federal civil immigration enforcement authorities.
- The federal government provides law enforcement funding to state and local governments through the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne JAG) Program.
- The U.S. Attorney General, Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, imposed new conditions on the receipt of Fiscal Year 2017 Byrne JAG funds.
- These conditions required grant recipients to provide federal agents with advance notice of the release date of any person in custody believed to be an alien (the "notice" condition).
- The conditions also required recipients to grant federal agents access to their correctional facilities to meet with these individuals (the "access" condition).
- Chicago's Welcoming City Ordinance was in direct conflict with these new conditions, placing the city at risk of losing its Byrne JAG funding.
- Prior to the Attorney General's action, Congress had repeatedly considered but failed to pass legislation that would have tied federal funding to local cooperation with immigration enforcement.
Procedural Posture:
- The City of Chicago sued Attorney General Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, a federal trial court.
- Chicago sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the Attorney General from enforcing the new "notice" and "access" conditions on the Byrne JAG grant program.
- The district court granted the preliminary injunction as to the notice and access conditions, applying it nationwide.
- The district court denied the Attorney General's motion to stay the nationwide injunction.
- The Attorney General, as appellant, appealed the grant of the preliminary injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the Attorney General have the statutory authority to impose conditions on recipients of Byrne JAG grants that require them to assist with federal civil immigration enforcement, specifically by providing notice of release dates and access to correctional facilities?
Opinions:
Majority - Rovner, Circuit Judge.
No. The Attorney General does not have the statutory authority to impose these conditions because Congress, which holds the power of the purse, did not delegate such authority. The statute cited by the Attorney General, 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6), is a catch-all provision that merely provides examples of powers that could be delegated, not an independent grant of sweeping authority to create new grant conditions. The structure of the Byrne JAG program as a formula grant with highly specific, limited powers for the Attorney General further indicates that Congress did not intend to grant such broad, discretionary power. Imposing these conditions without congressional authorization is an unconstitutional usurpation of legislative power and violates the separation of powers.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Manion, Circuit Judge.
No. I agree with the majority that the Attorney General lacks the statutory authority to impose the Notice and Access conditions. However, the district court's remedy of a nationwide injunction was an overstep of its authority. An injunction should be no more burdensome than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiff, the City of Chicago. A nationwide injunction improperly prevents the legal issue from developing in other circuits, contrary to the principles of United States v. Mendoza, and is not necessary to protect Chicago's interests.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the constitutional principle of separation of powers, specifically that the executive branch cannot use the "power of the purse" to coerce policy changes at the state and local level without explicit authorization from Congress. It sets a precedent that executive agencies cannot find broad, discretionary authority in vague or ancillary statutory provisions, especially when Congress has considered and rejected similar policies. The ruling also affirms the controversial use of nationwide injunctions against federal policies, provided the legal issue is purely one of law and the balance of equities supports such a broad remedy to prevent widespread, duplicative litigation.
