City of Canton v. State
95 Ohio St. 3d 149 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
A state statute is considered a "general law" that takes precedence over conflicting municipal police power ordinances under Ohio's Home-Rule Amendment only if it is part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, applies uniformly throughout the state, sets forth police/sanitary/similar regulations rather than merely limiting municipal power, and prescribes a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.
Facts:
- For many years, the city of Canton prohibited the placement or use of mobile homes as principal or accessory structures for residential use.
- On March 16, 1998, the city of Canton amended its code to include "manufactured homes" within the definition of "mobile homes," effectively prohibiting them for residential use within the city limits.
- In 1998, the Ohio General Assembly enacted R.C. 3781.184, effective March 30, 1999, relating to manufactured homes.
- Subsection (C) of R.C. 3781.184 forbids political subdivisions from prohibiting or restricting the location of permanently sited manufactured homes in any zone or district in which a single-family home is permitted.
- Subsection (D) of R.C. 3781.184 permits private landowners to incorporate restrictive covenants in deeds to prohibit the inclusion of manufactured homes.
Procedural Posture:
- On March 29, 1999, the city of Canton filed an action in the Stark County Common Pleas Court, seeking a declaration that R.C. 3781.184 was an unconstitutional infringement of municipal home-rule powers.
- The trial court, ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, granted Canton’s motion and denied the state’s motion, finding that R.C. 3781.184, in its entirety, violated the Home-Rule Amendment.
- The state appealed the trial court's judgment to the Stark County Court of Appeals.
- The Stark County Court of Appeals, in a split decision, reversed the trial court’s judgment.
- The cause is now before the Ohio Supreme Court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal.
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Issue:
Does R.C. 3781.184(C) and (D), which prohibit political subdivisions from restricting permanently sited manufactured homes in single-family zones but allow private restrictive covenants, constitute a "general law" under Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, thereby taking precedence over a conflicting municipal zoning ordinance?
Opinions:
Majority - Lundberg Stratton, J.
No, R.C. 3781.184(C) and (D) are not general laws and therefore violate the Home-Rule Amendment, Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution. The court established a four-part test for a statute to be considered a "general law" for home-rule analysis: it must (1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly, (3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations (rather than merely limiting municipal power), and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally. The court found that R.C. 3781.184(C) and (D) failed all four conditions. First, they are not part of a statewide comprehensive zoning plan, as R.C. Chapter 3781 is disparate, and federal preemption only covers construction/safety, not zoning. Second, the exception in R.C. 3781.184(D) allowing private restrictive covenants defeats uniform operation, as it enables newer developments to opt out, effectively limiting the statute's impact to older areas without such restrictions. This makes its application nonuniform. Third, because of this exception, the statute does not genuinely serve an overriding statewide interest in affordable housing; rather, it primarily purports to limit municipal legislative power. Fourth, the statute applies to municipal legislative bodies, not to citizens generally. Because the challenged subsections fail this test, they are an unconstitutional attempt to limit Canton's home-rule powers to zone. The court severed subsections (C) and (D), leaving (A) and (B) intact.
Dissenting - Pfeifer, J.
No, the majority's conclusion that R.C. 3781.184 violates the Home-Rule Amendment is incorrect because the statute is a general law and does not violate the constitution. Justice Pfeifer dissented from the majority's newly articulated four-part test and its application. He argued that R.C. 3781.184 is part of a comprehensive legislative enactment because it adopts federal construction standards statewide and addresses zoning by requiring manufactured homes in single-family zones. He contended the statute operates uniformly because it applies to all political subdivisions, and the existence of private restrictive covenants does not negate this uniformity, as laws need only apply to similarly situated people. He stated that the statute serves a valid statewide interest in increasing affordable housing options, and the restrictive covenants do not entirely defeat this purpose. Finally, he criticized the "rule of conduct upon citizens generally" element as overly broad, arguing that many valid state laws apply only to municipalities and political subdivisions (e.g., R.C. Title 7). Therefore, he concluded R.C. 3781.184 is a general law.
Concurring - Cook, J.
Yes, Canton Codified Ordinance 1129.11 may be enforced because those divisions of R.C. 3781.184 that conflict with it are not "general laws" as the term is used in the Home-Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution. Justice Cook concurred with the judgment to reverse the court of appeals, agreeing that the challenged divisions of R.C. 3781.184 are not "general laws" under Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarified the test for determining what constitutes a "general law" in Ohio for purposes of the Home-Rule Amendment. By consolidating previous precedents into a definitive four-part framework, the court provided a stricter standard for state statutes to preempt municipal police power ordinances. The emphasis on statewide comprehensiveness, uniform application (especially regarding exceptions), and whether the law prescribes a general rule of conduct rather than simply limiting municipal power, reinforces municipal authority in zoning and local governance. This ruling underscores the importance of truly uniform and pervasive state interests for legislative preemption, impacting how state legislatures might attempt to address issues like affordable housing in the future without infringing on local control.
