City and County of San Francisco v. EPA
604 U. S. ____ (2025) (2025)
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Rule of Law:
Section 1311(b)(1)(C) of the Clean Water Act does not authorize the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to include "end-result" provisions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits, which hold permittees responsible for the quality of receiving waters rather than specifying required actions. Instead, the EPA must determine and set out specific, actionable limitations that permittees must take to achieve water quality standards.
Facts:
- The City of San Francisco operates two combined wastewater treatment facilities, including the Oceanside facility, which process both wastewater and stormwater.
- During periods of heavy precipitation, the combination of wastewater and stormwater may exceed the facility’s capacity, resulting in discharges of untreated water, including raw sewage, into the Pacific Ocean or San Francisco Bay.
- In 1994, the EPA adopted its Combined Sewer Overflow (CSO) Control Policy, which requires municipalities with combined systems to take prescribed measures and develop a Long-Term Control Plan, implemented through a two-phase permitting process.
- For many years, San Francisco’s NPDES permit for its Oceanside facility was renewed without controversy.
- In 2019, the EPA issued a renewal permit for the Oceanside facility that added two "end-result" requirements: (1) prohibiting any discharge that "contribute[s] to a violation of any applicable water quality standard" for receiving waters, and (2) preventing any treatment or discharge that "create[s] pollution, contamination, or nuisance as defined by California Water Code section 13050."
Procedural Posture:
- The California Regional Water Quality Control Board for the San Francisco Bay Region approved the final Oceanside NPDES permit, including the challenged "end-result" requirements.
- The EPA also approved the permit.
- San Francisco appealed the permit's new provisions to the EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board (EAB).
- The EAB rejected San Francisco’s challenge.
- San Francisco filed a petition for review in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (appellate court) under 33 U. S. C. §1369(b)(1)(F).
- A divided Ninth Circuit panel denied San Francisco's (petitioner/appellant) petition for review, affirming the EPA's (respondent/appellee) authority.
- The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
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Issue:
Does Section 1311(b)(1)(C) of the Clean Water Act authorize the Environmental Protection Agency to include "end-result" provisions in NPDES permits that condition a permitholder's compliance on whether receiving waters meet applicable water quality standards, rather than imposing limitations that spell out specific actions a permittee must take?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Alito
No, Section 1311(b)(1)(C) of the Clean Water Act does not authorize the EPA to include "end-result" provisions in NPDES permits because the statutory text, structure, and historical context require the EPA to set specific, actionable limitations rather than making permittees responsible for the ultimate quality of receiving waters. The Court found that the terms "limitation," "implement," and "meet" in §1311(b)(1)(C) imply that the EPA must set specific rules or actions permittees must follow to achieve water quality goals. A "limitation" is a restriction "imposed from without," not an end-result requirement that leaves permittees to determine necessary steps, and to "implement" standards requires "concrete measures." The Court highlighted that the CWA's 1972 overhaul deliberately abandoned the pre-1972 Water Pollution Control Act's "backward-looking" enforcement model, which allowed direct enforcement based on receiving water quality, in favor of a system of "direct restrictions" on polluters; the Government's interpretation would effectively reintroduce this rejected approach. Furthermore, end-result requirements would negate the CWA’s "permit shield" provision (§1342(k)), which protects compliant permittees from liability, by exposing them to penalties even if they followed all specific permit terms but water quality standards were still violated. The broader statutory scheme also lacks a mechanism for fairly allocating responsibility among multiple dischargers, a problem the CWA sought to eliminate. Finally, the Court affirmed that the EPA possesses adequate tools and expertise to develop specific effluent or narrative limitations without resorting to end-result requirements.
Dissenting in part - Justice Barrett
Yes, Section 1311(b)(1)(C) of the Clean Water Act authorizes the EPA to impose permit conditions that prohibit discharges contributing to a violation of applicable water quality standards, as these are plainly "limitations" on a permittee's license to discharge. Justice Barrett, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, who also joined Part II of the majority opinion, argued that the ordinary meaning of "limitation" encompasses end-result requirements, which are simply "restrictive conditions" that can be general or specific. She contended that the phrases "necessary to meet" or "required to implement" water quality standards support this view, as these limitations make the standards enforceable and give them "practical effect." The dissent asserted that the CWA's shift from the pre-1972 abatement regime focused on moving from an ineffective ex post enforcement model to an ex ante permitting model with "direct restrictions," and receiving water limitations are consistent with this, supplementing technology-based limits. Concerns about unfairness or lack of notice should be addressed through challenges to specific permit conditions as arbitrary and capricious, rather than a categorical invalidation of receiving water limitations. The dissent also highlighted the practical utility of end-result limitations when the EPA lacks specific information or for issuing general permits, arguing that taking this tool away will make it harder and more time-consuming for the Agency to issue necessary permits.
Analysis:
This case significantly curtails the EPA's authority to use flexible "end-result" conditions in NPDES permits, shifting the burden more squarely onto the agency to define precise, actionable steps permittees must take. It reinforces a textualist and structuralist approach to statutory interpretation, particularly emphasizing the CWA's permit shield and historical shift away from "backward-looking" enforcement. The ruling could lead to more detailed and complex permit negotiations, potentially increasing administrative burdens for the EPA and state permitting authorities in developing specific, actionable limitations for every unique discharge scenario. It also clarifies that even "narrative limitations" must specify actions rather than simply mandating outcomes.
