Citizens Protecting Michigan's Constitution v. Secretary of State
921 N.W.2d 247, 503 Mich. 42 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
A voter-initiated constitutional proposal is a permissible 'amendment' under Const 1963, art 12, § 2 unless it proposes changes that significantly alter or abolish the form or structure of the government in a manner that is tantamount to creating a new constitution.
Facts:
- The Michigan Constitution of 1963 established a bipartisan commission to oversee legislative redistricting using apportionment standards based on both population and land area.
- In 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Reynolds v. Sims effectively invalidated apportionment standards based on factors other than population, such as land area.
- Following this federal precedent, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled in 1982 that the state's constitutional redistricting commission was not severable from the now-unconstitutional apportionment standards, thereby deactivating the commission.
- As a result of the commission's deactivation, the Michigan Legislature assumed control of the legislative redistricting process.
- A ballot-question committee, Voters Not Politicians (VNP), initiated a petition drive for a proposed constitutional amendment.
- The VNP proposal sought to create a new, independent 13-member citizens' commission (composed of Republicans, Democrats, and independents) to draw legislative districts based on a new set of criteria.
- VNP successfully collected a sufficient number of signatures from registered electors to qualify the proposal for placement on the November 2018 general election ballot.
Procedural Posture:
- Citizens Protecting Michigan's Constitution (CPMC) filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Michigan Court of Appeals, seeking to prevent the Secretary of State and the Board of State Canvassers from placing the VNP proposal on the ballot.
- CPMC, the plaintiff, argued the proposal was a 'general revision' only permissible through a constitutional convention, not an 'amendment' by initiative petition.
- Voters Not Politicians (VNP) intervened as a defendant and filed a cross-complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to compel placement of the proposal on the ballot.
- The Michigan Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court, issued a unanimous published opinion rejecting CPMC's request and granting VNP's, ordering the proposal to be placed on the November 2018 general election ballot.
- CPMC, as the appellant, sought leave to appeal the Court of Appeals' decision to the Michigan Supreme Court, the state's highest court.
- The Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the proposal was a permissible voter-initiated amendment.
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Issue:
Does a voter-initiated proposal that creates an independent commission to oversee legislative redistricting, thereby modifying the powers of the three branches of government with respect to that function, constitute a permissible constitutional 'amendment' under Const 1963, art 12, § 2, rather than a 'general revision' requiring a constitutional convention under Const 1963, art 12, § 3?
Opinions:
Majority - Viviano, J.
Yes, the proposal is a permissible constitutional amendment. A voter-initiated proposal is a valid amendment if it does not significantly alter or abolish the government's form or structure in a way that is equivalent to creating a new constitution. This proposal does not rise to that level because it is materially similar to the commission provided for in the 1963 Constitution and seeks to restore the people's original intent to have an independent body handle redistricting. The Legislature's current role in redistricting is merely a judicial stopgap resulting from the original commission being declared inoperable, not a constitutionally-granted power. The proposal's modifications to the vesting clauses of the three branches are harmonizing changes, not a fundamental restructuring of the separation of powers. Therefore, the proposal is an effort to improve upon a feature of the present Constitution, not to create a new one.
Dissenting - Markman, C.J.
No, the proposal is a 'general revision,' not a permissible amendment. The proper inquiry is whether the proposal fundamentally alters the nature or operation of government by comparing it to the current system, not a defunct constitutional provision. Removing the foundational power of redistricting from the elected, accountable Legislature and transferring it to an unelected, unaccountable commission of 13 randomly selected citizens is a fundamental change. This is evidenced by the proposal's modification of the core vesting clauses for the legislative, executive, and judicial branches (Articles 4, 5, and 6), which effectively creates a fourth branch of government. Such a profound restructuring of government requires the deliberative process of a constitutional convention, not a simple ballot initiative.
Dissenting - Wilder, J.
No, the proposal is ineligible for the ballot due to a procedural failure. The proposal requires applicants for the redistricting commission to 'attest under oath' about their political affiliation. This requirement directly conflicts with the Michigan Constitution's Oath Clause (Art 11, § 1), which prohibits requiring any 'other oath' for public office. By creating this conflict, the proposal effectively 'abrogates' or renders the Oath Clause inoperative. Under Art 12, § 2, any proposal that abrogates an existing constitutional provision must republish the text of that provision in the petition. VNP failed to republish the Oath Clause, and this failure to strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory form requirements is fatal to the petition.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a new, high standard for invalidating a voter-initiated amendment on the grounds that it is a 'general revision.' By defining the limit as anything 'tantamount to creating a new constitution,' the Court makes it significantly more difficult for opponents to block substantial structural reforms from the ballot. The ruling empowers direct democracy, sanctioning the use of the initiative process to create independent bodies that reallocate powers traditionally held by the legislative branch. This precedent will likely reduce the effectiveness of legal challenges against future citizen-led constitutional amendments aimed at government reform, shifting the debate from the courtroom to the ballot box.
