Citizens Against Pollution Northwest, Inc. v. Connecticut Siting Council
217 Conn. 143, 1991 Conn. LEXIS 12, 584 A.2d 1183 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
When a statute revising administrative procedures expressly states that it applies to agency proceedings 'commenced on or after' a specific effective date, that commencement date governs the applicability of the new law for all aspects of the case, including subsequent appeals.
Facts:
- On December 5, 1988, Bio-Gen Torrington Partnership (Bio-Gen) applied to the Connecticut Siting Council (council) for a certificate to build an electricity generating facility.
- In the spring of 1989, the council held public hearings where Citizens Against Pollution Northwest, Inc. (CAP) became a party through intervention.
- On July 1, 1989, Public Acts 1988, No. 88-317 (the 'act') took effect, which amended the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA) and extended the time for serving an administrative appeal from 30 days to 45 days.
- On November 22, 1989, the council rendered its decision granting Bio-Gen’s application.
- The council mailed copies of its decision to all parties on November 30, 1989.
- On January 12, 1990, forty-three days after the council mailed its decision, CAP served copies of its appeal upon all parties of record.
Procedural Posture:
- Citizens Against Pollution Northwest, Inc. (CAP) appealed the Connecticut Siting Council's decision to the Superior Court.
- The defendants, Bio-Gen and the council, filed motions to dismiss the appeal in the Superior Court, alleging a lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to untimely service.
- The Superior Court granted the motions to dismiss, finding that the appeal was not served within the 30-day period required by the statute in effect when the proceeding commenced.
- CAP, as the appellant, appealed the dismissal to the Appellate Court.
- The Supreme Court of Connecticut transferred the appeal from the Appellate Court to itself for review.
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Issue:
Does a statutory amendment to administrative appeal procedures, which states it is applicable to 'all agency proceedings commenced on or after' a specific date, apply to an appeal where the underlying agency proceeding began before that date but the agency's final decision and the subsequent appeal occurred after that date?
Opinions:
Majority - Glass, J.
No, the statutory amendment does not apply; the law in effect when the agency proceeding commenced governs all subsequent stages, including the appeal. The court held that the act's applicability clause, which states it applies to 'all agency proceedings commenced on or after' July 1, 1989, is an express legislative directive that controls. The court relied on its recent precedent in Vernon Village, Inc., which interpreted the same statutory language to mean that the single standard for the act's applicability is tied to the commencement date of the underlying agency proceeding. The court rejected CAP's argument that the term 'agency proceedings' excludes subsequent judicial appeals, finding this interpretation would contradict the legislature's intent to create a clear, singular standard. Furthermore, the court distinguished Chieppo v. Robert E. McMichael, Inc., noting that the statute in that case lacked a specific applicability clause tied to the commencement of proceedings. While procedural statutes are often applied retroactively, that presumption is overcome by an express legislative directive to the contrary, as was present here. Since Bio-Gen's original application to the council commenced the proceeding in 1988, before the act's effective date, the prior version of the UAPA with its 30-day service requirement governs. CAP's failure to serve within that 30-day period was a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle that legislative directives on statutory applicability are paramount and can override general rules of construction, such as the presumption of retroactivity for procedural statutes. It emphasizes that the commencement date of an administrative proceeding can be the critical anchor for determining which set of rules applies throughout the entire life of a case, including judicial review. The case serves as a crucial lesson for legal practitioners on the importance of carefully scrutinizing the effective date and applicability clauses of new legislation, as a failure to apply the correct procedural timeline can result in a fatal jurisdictional defect, regardless of the merits of the appeal.
