Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.

Supreme Court of the United States
(1992)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 does not preempt state-law damages actions. The Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, however, expressly preempts state-law damages actions based on claims of failure to warn or neutralization of warnings in advertising and promotion, but does not preempt claims based on breach of express warranty, intentional fraud, and conspiracy.

Facts:

Rose Cipollone began smoking cigarettes in 1942 and continued to smoke for over 40 years.
During this time, she smoked cigarettes manufactured and sold by the respondents, Liggett Group, Inc., and others.
Cipollone alleged that the manufacturers' advertising contained express warranties that their cigarettes were safe and did not present any significant health consequences.
Cipollone also alleged that the manufacturers possessed, but intentionally concealed and failed to act upon, medical and scientific data indicating that cigarettes were hazardous to consumers' health.
The manufacturers allegedly conspired to deprive the public of this medical and scientific data.
Rose Cipollone developed lung cancer.
In 1984, Rose Cipollone died as a result of her lung cancer.

Procedural Posture:

Rose Cipollone and her husband sued three cigarette manufacturers in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging various state common law claims.
The District Court initially denied the manufacturers' preemption defense.
On interlocutory appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, as the intermediate appellate court, reversed, holding that the federal acts impliedly preempted state law damages actions that challenged advertising and promotion.
After the case was remanded, a trial was held in the District Court under the Third Circuit's preemption ruling.
The jury found for the petitioner on a pre-1966 express warranty claim and awarded damages, but found for the manufacturers on other claims.
On cross-appeals from the final judgment, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's preemption rulings.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the courts of appeals regarding the preemptive effect of the federal statutes.

Premium Content

Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief

You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture

Issue:

Do the preemption clauses of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 preempt state common law damages claims against cigarette manufacturers for conduct that occurred after the effective dates of the Acts?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Stevens

No, as to the 1965 Act; Yes, in part, as to the 1969 Act. The 1965 Act's preemption clause, which barred states from requiring any 'statement relating to smoking and health' in advertising, was narrowly written to preempt only positive enactments by legislative and administrative bodies, not common law damages actions. However, the 1969 Act's broader preemption clause, barring any 'requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health... imposed under State law with respect to... advertising or promotion,' does preempt certain common law claims. A claim-by-claim analysis reveals that failure-to-warn claims are preempted to the extent they are based on a duty to provide additional warnings in advertising, as this would constitute a 'requirement' imposed under state law. Conversely, claims for breach of an express warranty are not preempted because the 'requirement' stems from the manufacturer's voluntary promise, not a duty 'imposed under State law.' Claims for intentional fraud by false statement are also not preempted because they are based on a general duty not to deceive, rather than a duty specifically 'based on smoking and health.'

Dissenting - Justice Blackmun

No. Neither the 1965 Act nor the 1969 Act preempts any of the state common law damages claims at issue. The Court correctly holds that the 1965 Act does not preempt these claims. The plurality's conclusion that the 1969 Act preempts some claims is incorrect because the amended language ('requirement or prohibition') is not a 'clear and manifest' statement of congressional intent to displace state tort remedies, which serve a compensatory in addition to a regulatory purpose. The strong presumption against preemption requires that such ambiguous language be construed not to preempt these historic state police powers. The plurality creates a 'crazy quilt' of preemption with unprincipled distinctions between claims, a result Congress could not have intended.

Dissenting - Justice Scalia

Yes. The 1965 Act preempts the failure-to-warn claims, and the 1969 Act preempts all of the petitioner's common law claims. The majority's newly crafted doctrine of narrowly construing express preemption provisions is incorrect; such provisions should be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning. The 1965 Act's prohibition on requiring any 'statement' plainly covers a common law duty to warn in advertising. The 1969 Act preempts all claims because they all impose 'requirements' under state law. A duty to honor an express warranty is imposed by state contract law, and a duty not to commit fraud is a state-law duty that, in this context, is 'based on smoking and health.' The Court's distinctions are illogical and will create confusion for lower courts.

Analysis:

This case is significant for establishing that an express preemption provision displaces any analysis of implied preemption, focusing the inquiry solely on the scope of the explicit statutory language. The Court's holding created a nuanced, claim-by-claim approach for determining preemption, distinguishing between duties imposed by state law (which may be preempted) and duties voluntarily undertaken by a defendant or arising from general obligations like honesty (which may not be). This fragmented decision highlighted deep divisions on the Court regarding preemption principles and left a complex, and some argued unworkable, framework for subsequent litigation involving regulated products.

Gunnerbot

AI-powered case assistant

Loaded: Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992)

Try: "What was the holding?" or "Explain the dissent"

Premium Feature