Cindy Garcia v. Google, Inc.
2015 WL 2343967, 786 F.3d 727 (2015)
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Rule of Law:
A court order requiring the removal of politically significant speech from a public platform constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint under the First Amendment, even when the speech is offensive and has resulted in threats of violence against those involved. The loss of First Amendment freedoms for even a minimal period of time constitutes irreparable injury.
Facts:
- Mark Basseley Youssef wrote and directed the film 'Innocence of Muslims.'
- Cindy Lee Garcia performed in the film under the belief that it was an uncontroversial movie titled 'Desert Warrior.'
- Youssef later dubbed over Garcia's lines, creating a film that was highly offensive to many Muslims by portraying the Prophet Mohammed as an evil figure.
- The film was uploaded to YouTube, a platform owned by Google, and its release sparked international outrage and became a subject of global political discourse.
- An Egyptian cleric issued a fatwa, a religious edict interpreted as a death threat, against everyone involved in the film's creation.
- The film was cited by some as a contributing cause of the riots in Benghazi, Libya, that resulted in the death of the United States Ambassador.
Procedural Posture:
- Cindy Lee Garcia sued Google, Inc. in the United States District Court, seeking a preliminary injunction to compel the removal of the film 'Innocence of Muslims' from YouTube.
- The district court (trial court) denied Garcia's request for a preliminary injunction.
- Garcia appealed the denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- A divided three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and issued an injunction ordering Google to remove all copies of the film from its platforms.
- Google filed a motion requesting a stay of the panel's takedown order, which the panel denied.
- A judge of the Ninth Circuit then made an emergency sua sponte request for a vote on whether to rehear the panel's denial of the stay en banc.
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Issue:
Does a court order requiring the removal of a politically controversial film from a public platform, in response to threats of violence against those involved in the film, constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech in violation of the First Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Thomas, Chief Judge
This order does not address the substantive legal issue of the takedown order's constitutionality. It is a procedural order explaining the history of the en banc votes in this case. It notes that a majority of non-recused active judges did not vote in favor of immediately rehearing the panel's stay order en banc on an emergency basis, but later voted to rehear the panel's underlying merits opinion en banc through the normal process.
Dissenting - Reinhardt, Judge
Yes, the court order constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. By ordering the removal of the film in response to violent threats from those offended by its message, the court imposed a prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment. This action effectively allowed a 'heckler's veto,' surrendering to threats from extremists and undermining the free exchange of ideas. The film, despite its offensive nature, was political speech of the highest order, central to an ongoing global news story, and the public had a right to view and debate it. Citing precedents like New York Times Co. v. United States, the dissent argues that even grave threats cannot justify the suppression of speech of great national import. The loss of First Amendment freedoms for the fifteen months the injunction was in place constituted irreparable harm.
Analysis:
This dissent provides a robust defense of the First Amendment principle against prior restraints and the 'heckler's veto' doctrine. It argues forcefully that a court cannot suppress protected speech to appease those who threaten violence, as doing so undermines the very foundation of free expression. The opinion emphasizes that even temporary censorship causes irreparable constitutional harm, setting a strong precedent against judicial orders that restrict public access to controversial political speech in response to threats. This reasoning challenges courts to uphold free speech principles even in the face of significant public hostility and safety concerns.
