Yes, the city's laws were unconstitutional. The Court said it was obvious the laws were created just to stop the Santería church. They weren't 'neutral' because the city council only passed them after the church came to town, and the laws used religious words like 'ritual' and 'sacrifice.' They weren't 'generally applicable' because they banned the church's animal killing but made exceptions for many other types of animal killing. Because the laws unfairly targeted one religion, they broke the First Amendment's promise of religious freedom.

Yes, the laws are illegal. But we shouldn't try to read the minds of the politicians who wrote the law. What matters is what the law actually does. And these laws clearly single out a religious practice for punishment while letting similar activities slide, which is not allowed.

Yes, the laws are definitely illegal because they were clearly aimed at the church. But I also think a previous Supreme Court decision, called *Smith*, made it too hard for religions to get protection from laws that apply to everyone. We should think about changing that *Smith* rule in the future.

Yes, the laws are illegal. I believe that *any* law that creates a serious problem for someone's religious practice should have to pass the toughest test. These laws fail that test because they were written to punish the church while ignoring other, similar issues. When a law targets religion like this, it's automatically unconstitutional.

No, the laws are not allowed because they are not fair or applied equally to everyone. The laws target Santeria animal sacrifice but allow many other animal killings. They were designed to stop the Santeria practices specifically. The city has not shown a good enough reason to justify laws that single out a religious practice. The laws go too far in restricting the Santeria religion to serve the city's goals.

I agree the laws are unconstitutional but focus more on how they are not applied equally to everyone rather than how they single out a religion. Laws that are unfair to a religion are usually unconstitutional if they impose restrictions specifically based on religion. But laws that seem to apply to everyone equally can still be unconstitutional if they are designed or enforced in a way that targets a specific religious practice.

I'm writing separately to explain why the rule from the Smith case does not apply here, and to say the Court should reconsider that rule in a future appropriate case. The laws here violate the basic principle that the government cannot persecute people for their religion. But the Smith rule, which says a generally applicable law can prohibit religious practices, is not needed to decide this case and should be reconsidered later.

I still believe the Smith decision was wrong because it ignored the importance of religious freedom as an individual right. When a law restricts religious practice, it must be the least restrictive way to achieve a very important government goal. Here, the laws fail because they restrict more religious conduct than necessary and don't restrict nonreligious conduct that causes the same harms. So the laws cannot withstand strict examination.

"[A] law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice."

—a law that is not neutral and generally applicable "must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest

—hold that, under the Free Exercise Clause, a court must strictly scrutinize any law that burdens religious practice and is not neutral and generally applicable.

—the high court considered specific statements by members of the Hialeah City Council as evidence that the ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice was intended to suppress the Santeria religion.

—"[o] fficial action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality."

A law is not neutral "if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation."

At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons

A law is not generally applicable if it "in a selective manner impose [s] burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief

—the Supreme Court explained how a court must examine whether a facially discriminatory government action is justified by a compelling interest: Where government restricts only conduct protected by the First Amendment and fails to enact feasible measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm or alleged harm of the same sort, the interest given in …

Lacking any legitimate reason for excluding the Club's speech from its forum- "because it's religious" will not do,

Yes, the city ordinances violate the Free Exercise Clause. A law that burdens religious practice is not neutral if its object is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation. Here, the ordinances were not neutral because the legislative history, contemporaneous statements by council members, and the series of events leading to their enactment revealed an object of targeting the Santería religion. The use of terms like 'sacrifice' and 'ritual' and the timing of the enactments immediately following the Church's announcement demonstrated this targeted object. Furthermore, the ordinances were not of general applicability because they were substantially underinclusive; they failed to prohibit a broad range of nonreligious conduct that endangered the city's asserted interests in public health and animal welfare (e.g., hunting, fishing, euthanasia, restaurant garbage disposal), thereby imposing burdens almost exclusively on religious conduct. Because the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable, they were subject to strict scrutiny, which they failed because they were not narrowly tailored and the city's interests were not compelling in light of the laws' underinclusiveness.

Yes, the ordinances are unconstitutional. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment and most of the opinion but wrote separately to object to the majority's inquiry into the subjective motivation of the city council members. He argued that constitutional analysis should focus on the objective purpose and effect of the law itself, not the difficult and often irrelevant task of determining the singular 'motive' of a collective legislative body. The ordinances are invalid because their text, design, and operation demonstrate they are not generally applicable and impermissibly target religious practice, regardless of the personal intentions of the lawmakers.

Yes, the ordinances are unconstitutional. Justice Souter concurred in the judgment because the Hialeah ordinances were clearly aimed at suppressing religious practice and thus failed even the most basic requirement of neutrality. However, he wrote separately to express his significant doubts about the validity of the rule established in *Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith*. He argued that this case was easy and did not require applying the *Smith* rule, and that in a future case the Court should reexamine whether *Smith* was correctly decided, given its tension with decades of Free Exercise precedent that required compelling interests to justify any substantial burden on religion.

Yes, the ordinances are unconstitutional. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment but reiterated his dissent in *Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith*. He maintained that any law, whether neutral or not, that substantially burdens the free exercise of religion must be justified by a compelling state interest and be the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. The Hialeah ordinances, being both overinclusive and underinclusive, clearly fail this strict scrutiny test. A law that specifically targets religion, as these ordinances do, automatically fails strict scrutiny by its very nature.

Yes, the ordinances are unconstitutional because they are neither neutral nor generally applicable. The ordinances target the Santeria religion's practice of animal sacrifice while providing exemptions for many other types of animal killings. The laws were gerrymandered to proscribe religious killings of animals but to exclude almost all secular killings. The city has not demonstrated that its interests are compelling enough to justify such a targeted restriction on religious practice. The ordinances suppress much more religious conduct than is necessary to achieve the city's stated interests in public health and preventing animal cruelty.

I agree with the majority's conclusion but would place more emphasis on the ordinances' lack of general applicability than their lack of neutrality. The defect of lack of neutrality applies primarily to laws that by their terms impose disabilities on the basis of religion, whereas the defect of lack of general applicability applies primarily to those laws which, though neutral in their terms, through their design, construction, or enforcement target the practices of a particular religion for discriminatory treatment.

I write separately to explain why the Smith rule is not germane to this case and to express my view that, in a case presenting the issue, the Court should reexamine the rule Smith declared. The ordinances in this case are unconstitutional because they violate the fundamental nonpersecution principle of the First Amendment. However, the rule announced in Smith, that a neutral, generally applicable law does not violate the Free Exercise Clause even if it prohibits religious exercise, is not necessary to decide this case and should be reexamined in an appropriate future case.

I continue to believe Smith was wrongly decided because it ignored the value of religious freedom as an affirmative individual liberty. When the State burdens religious practice, it must justify that burden by showing it is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling interest. Here, the ordinances fail because they are both overinclusive, prohibiting more religious conduct than necessary, and underinclusive, failing to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangers the government's interests. Thus, the ordinances cannot survive strict scrutiny.

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah

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