Chronister ex rel. Morrison v. Brenneman
1999 Pa. Super. LEXIS 4042, 1999 Pa. Super. 284, 742 A.2d 190 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
A parent's use of corporal punishment for disciplinary purposes does not constitute "abuse" under the Pennsylvania Protection From Abuse Act so long as it causes only temporary pain and is not designed or known to create a substantial risk of serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme pain, or mental distress.
Facts:
- After sixteen-year-old Cassandra Morrison admitted to lying to her father, the appellant, he administered corporal punishment.
- Appellant hit Cassandra four or five times on the buttocks with a folded belt.
- The strapping was painful and caused Cassandra to cry, but she later told a Child and Youth Services (CYS) caseworker that it did not leave any bruises.
- Later that evening, while discussing house rules, appellant retrieved a pistol from a cupboard.
- Appellant checked to ensure the gun was unloaded, walked past Cassandra making eye contact with her, and took the firearm upstairs to a closet for storage.
- Cassandra testified that she was frightened by the incident and appellant's statements that similar punishment would follow for future misconduct.
- Cassandra and her half-sister testified that the strapping caused bruises and left fingerprints on her arm.
Procedural Posture:
- Shannon Chronister, on behalf of her half-sister Cassandra Morrison, filed a Petition for Protection From Abuse against Cassandra's father (appellant) in the trial court.
- The trial court issued a temporary Protection From Abuse (PFA) order.
- Following a full hearing where testimony was presented, the trial court entered a final PFA order against the father.
- The father, as appellant, appealed the final PFA order to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
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Issue:
Does a parent's act of hitting a sixteen-year-old child four to five times on the buttocks with a folded belt as a form of discipline, which causes temporary pain but no significant injury, constitute "abuse" under the Pennsylvania Protection From Abuse Act?
Opinions:
Majority - Brosky, J.
No. A parent's use of corporal punishment that is intended for discipline and results in only temporary pain without bodily impairment does not meet the statutory definition of "abuse." The court reasoned that the father's motivation was discipline, not a malevolent infliction of pain. Under the Protection from Abuse Act, "abuse" requires causing "bodily injury," which is defined as "impairment of physical condition or substantial pain." The court found no evidence of impairment and concluded the pain was temporary and intentional for discipline. Furthermore, the court cited Pennsylvania's statutory parental "privilege" (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 509), which permits the use of force for a minor's welfare and punishment, provided the force is not designed to cause death, serious bodily injury, or extreme pain. To define this disciplinary act as abuse would create a logical inconsistency with the recognized parental privilege.
Dissenting - Orie Melvin, J.
Yes. A parent's act of striking a child with a belt hard enough to cause bruising and leave hand-prints constitutes "abuse" under the Act. The dissent argued that the majority improperly disregarded the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations. The trial court found credible Cassandra's and her sister's testimony that she sustained bruises and fingerprints, which satisfies the "bodily injury" requirement under the Act, consistent with precedent like Miller v. Walker. The dissent contended that this level of force, which left lasting marks, crossed the line from reasonable discipline into abuse inflicted by an enraged parent. The standard of review required viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner, which the majority failed to do.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the legal distinction between privileged parental corporal punishment and statutory child abuse in Pennsylvania. It establishes that for an act of physical discipline to be considered "abuse" under the Protection From Abuse Act, there must be evidence of harm beyond temporary pain, such as bodily impairment or bruising. The case signals that appellate courts will be reluctant to interfere with a parent's choice of discipline, even if viewed as "old fashioned," unless it clearly crosses the statutory threshold into abuse. This ruling reinforces the parental privilege codified in state law and sets a relatively high bar for obtaining a protection order in cases involving corporal punishment.
