Christopher Henkel and Lisa Henkel v. Christopher Norman
57 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1261, 441 S.W.3d 249, 2014 Tex. LEXIS 692 (2014)
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Rule of Law:
A property owner's warning to an invitee of an unreasonably dangerous condition is adequate if, given the totality of the surrounding circumstances, the warning identifies and communicates the existence of the condition in a manner that a reasonable person would perceive and understand, even if it does not specify the exact material causing the condition.
Facts:
- On Saturday, January 9, 2010, mail carrier Christopher Norman was delivering mail in Houston during a period of colder than normal weather, for which a hard freeze warning had been issued.
- Lisa Henkel, one of the homeowner defendants, was aware of icy conditions in her neighborhood, and her daughter had slipped on some ice in the road that morning.
- Norman approached the house of Christopher and Lisa Henkel through their lawn to deliver their mail to Lisa, who was standing at the door.
- After handing Lisa the mail, as Norman turned to leave and continue on his route by walking on the Henkels’ sidewalk, Lisa told him “don’t slip.”
- Norman subsequently slipped and fell on the Henkels’ sidewalk, denying he had seen ice on his route or on their property before his fall.
Procedural Posture:
- Christopher Norman sued Christopher and Lisa Henkel in trial court, alleging injuries from the fall due to the Henkels' failure to prevent an unnatural accumulation of ice, remove the ice, or otherwise remedy the slick conditions.
- The Henkels filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting that Lisa had explicitly warned Norman regarding potentially icy conditions.
- The trial court granted the Henkels' motion for summary judgment.
- Norman appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas.
- The Court of Appeals, by a two to one decision, reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that a general instruction not to slip or trip or fall is not conclusive evidence of an adequate warning.
- The Henkels filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court of Texas.
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Issue:
Does a homeowner’s statement “don’t slip” adequately warn an invitee of a slippery sidewalk condition as a matter of law, thereby discharging the homeowner’s duty to warn under premises liability, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes, a homeowner's statement 'don't slip' can adequately warn an invitee of a slippery sidewalk condition as a matter of law, thereby discharging the homeowner's duty to warn under premises liability, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals, agreeing with the trial court that Lisa Henkel's 'don't slip' statement was an adequate warning as a matter of law. The Court reiterated that premises owners have a duty to protect invitees from, or warn them of, conditions posing unreasonable risks of harm if the owners knew or should have known of them. This duty is negated if an adequate warning is given. While a warning must be more than a general instruction like 'be careful' and must notify of the particular condition, it is not required to identify the specific material causing the condition (e.g., ice vs. water), so long as the existence of the condition itself (slippery surface) is conveyed. In this case, considering the totality of the circumstances, including well-below-freezing temperatures and the absence of other obvious causes for a 'don't slip' warning, a reasonable person would understand the statement to mean there were slippery conditions. The Court distinguished it from cases where warnings were too general (like a speed limit sign not warning of a pothole in TXI Operations, L.P. v. Perry, 278 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. 2009)), and aligned it with cases where 'watch the wet spot' (Bill’s Dollar Store, Inc. v. Bean, 77 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied)) or 'floor may be a little damp' (Brooks v. PRH Invs., Inc., 303 S.W.3d 920 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.)) were deemed adequate. The Court assumed, without deciding, that ice on the Henkels' sidewalk created an unreasonably dangerous condition but found the warning sufficient to discharge the Henkels' duty.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the adequacy of warnings in premises liability cases in Texas, emphasizing a 'totality of the circumstances' approach. It establishes that a warning need not specify the exact substance causing a dangerous condition (e.g., ice vs. water) but must effectively communicate the type of danger (e.g., slipperiness). This ruling provides property owners with a clearer standard for discharging their duty to warn invitees, potentially making it easier for them to obtain summary judgment if they can demonstrate a contextual warning of a general dangerous condition like slipperiness.
