Christopher Graham v. Long Island Rail Road
84 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 276, 230 F.3d 34, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 26012 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, a plaintiff need not show that they and their comparators engaged in identical conduct. Rather, they must show the comparators were 'similarly situated in all material respects,' which means they were subject to the same workplace standards and their conduct was of 'comparable seriousness.'
Facts:
- The Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) hired Christopher Graham, a black man, as a car appearance maintainer in 1975.
- Graham had several disciplinary infractions over the years, including three suspensions.
- On August 3, 1988, Graham tested positive for cocaine and was subsequently dismissed by LIRR without being offered a 'last chance waiver.'
- On April 15, 1991, a mediation board reinstated Graham under a last chance waiver, which stipulated that any future violation of the company's drug and alcohol policy would result in his dismissal.
- On June 17, 1991, Graham was ordered to submit another urine sample, which LIRR's chosen lab reported as positive for alcohol.
- Based on the positive test, LIRR terminated Graham's employment on June 19, 1991.
- A white employee, A.J. Elmendorf, received a last chance waiver for a positive cocaine test and, after testing positive again, was given a second last chance waiver instead of being dismissed.
- Another white employee, Carl DiPersia, received three last chance waivers—the first for a drug violation and two subsequent ones for excessive absenteeism—before being dismissed.
Procedural Posture:
- Christopher Graham filed suit against the Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title VII.
- After discovery, LIRR moved for summary judgment, arguing that Graham could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
- The district court granted summary judgment in favor of LIRR, concluding that Graham failed to show he was discharged under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination because the white employees he cited were not similarly situated.
- Graham, as the appellant, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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Issue:
In a Title VII disparate treatment claim, does a plaintiff raise a triable issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment by showing that coworkers outside their protected class, who were subject to the same disciplinary policy, received more lenient treatment for violations of 'comparable seriousness'?
Opinions:
Majority - Cardamone, J.
Yes. A plaintiff raises a triable issue of fact by showing that similarly situated employees outside of their protected class were treated more favorably for conduct of comparable seriousness. To be 'similarly situated,' employees must be subject to the same performance and disciplinary standards, and their conduct must be of 'comparable seriousness,' not necessarily identical. The court reasoned that whether employees are similarly situated is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, and the district court applied an 'unduly inflexible standard' by requiring the comparator employees' conduct to be identical. Here, Graham, Elmendorf, and DiPersia were all subject to the same categorical last chance waiver policy, which mandated dismissal for 'any' violation. A rational jury could find that Elmendorf's second drug offense and DiPersia's absenteeism were of 'comparable seriousness' to Graham's alcohol violation. The fact that the two white employees received multiple chances while Graham, a black employee, was dismissed after his first violation under the waiver is sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination and establish a prima facie case, thereby making summary judgment for the employer inappropriate.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the 'similarly situated' standard for disparate treatment claims in the Second Circuit, rejecting a rigid, identical-conduct requirement. By defining the standard as 'comparable seriousness,' the court makes it more difficult for employers to defeat discrimination claims at the summary judgment stage. This precedent empowers plaintiffs by allowing comparisons to coworkers who engaged in different but arguably equivalent misconduct under a common disciplinary policy. The ruling emphasizes that the 'similarly situated' analysis is a fact-intensive inquiry best left to a jury, reinforcing that summary judgment should be used sparingly where an employer's intent is at issue.
