Christofferson v. CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY, ETC.

Majority - Gillette, P. J.

No, the First Amendment does not preclude a jury from determining the truth or falsity of alleged misrepresentations made by a religious organization in a fraud action if the organization offered its services for a wholly secular purpose. No, the defendants' conduct did not constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress as a matter of law. Regarding the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the court found that no conduct, whether individual acts or a 'scheme,' met the legal standard of being 'outrageous in the extreme' or 'beyond the limits of social toleration.' Christofferson joined and participated in Scientology voluntarily. The 'drills' she underwent, while intense, were not legally outrageous given her voluntary participation and continued contact with non-Scientologists. The 'Fair Game' policy, though described as concerning, did not provide evidence that Christofferson feared defendants during her association. Post-disassociation actions by defendants—including filing a libel suit (without proof it was unfounded), issuing an internal directive for staff not to contact Christofferson (which was a response to her attorney's cease-and-desist letter), innocuous mailings, and alleged brief surveillance—also failed to meet the high threshold for outrageous conduct. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying directed verdicts for all defendants on this claim. For the fraud claim, the court ruled that directed verdicts should have been granted for the Church of Scientology of Portland (COSOP) and the Delphian Foundation. There was no evidence that COSOP agents made misrepresentations or knew about the Mission's alleged fraud, nor was there an agency or 'alter ego' relationship connecting Delphian to the Mission's alleged misrepresentations. However, the denial of a directed verdict for Martin Samuels, as president of the Mission and Delphian, was affirmed because a jury could reasonably find he had knowledge of at least some of the alleged misrepresentations. Critically, regarding the First Amendment defense to fraud, the court held that Scientology is a religion and the Mission is a religious organization as a matter of law, and the challenged courses and auditing relate to its religious beliefs and practices. However, the trial court erred by submitting to the jury the question of whether individual statements were 'religious in nature' and 'held out as such in good faith.' Instead, the jury should have been instructed to determine whether the services and statements, despite their religious character, were offered for a 'wholly secular purpose,' meaning a purpose other than inducing participation in the religion, such as solely to obtain money. If the jury found a wholly secular purpose, then the truth or falsity of the representations could be examined. The court clarified that the 'sincerity' or 'good faith' of the organization's agents in their religious belief is not the correct inquiry for liability. The trial court also erred by failing to define 'material fact' for the jury and by not instructing the jury, as a matter of law, that Scientology is a religion. Finally, the court found that the imposition of punitive damages for fraud is not constitutionally impermissible in the context of free exercise of religion, provided the statements are found to be non-religious as made.