Christensen v. Superior Court
2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79, 820 P.2d 181, 54 Cal.3d 868 (1991)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A provider of funeral or crematory services owes a duty of care to the close family members of a decedent for whom the services are performed, allowing recovery for emotional distress from negligent mishandling of remains even without witnessing the misconduct. This duty is limited to those family members who were aware that the services were being performed for their benefit.
Facts:
- Plaintiffs' relatives died, and arrangements were made with mortuary defendants for funeral-related services, including cremation.
- The mortuary defendants contracted with crematory defendants to perform the cremations.
- Over a period of several years, the crematory defendants engaged in a pattern of improper and illegal handling of human remains.
- This misconduct included performing multiple cremations at once, commingling human remains, and removing and selling organs, body parts, and precious metals from the decedents' remains without authorization.
- Defendant Carolina Biological Supply Company purchased human organs and body parts from the crematory defendants.
- The plaintiffs did not personally observe any of the alleged misconduct.
- In February 1987, plaintiffs first learned from public media reports that their decedents' remains had allegedly been mishandled.
- Upon learning of the misconduct, the plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress.
Procedural Posture:
- Numerous individual lawsuits were filed against the defendants and were subsequently coordinated in a superior court proceeding.
- The trial court, ruling on the issue of standing based on a model complaint, held that only those plaintiffs entitled by statute to control disposition of the remains or who actually contracted for the services had standing to sue.
- Plaintiffs petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to expand the class of eligible plaintiffs.
- The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ, holding that all close family members could sue for negligent mishandling and that all family members and close friends could sue for intentional mishandling.
- The mortuary and crematory defendants sought review of the Court of Appeal's decision from the Supreme Court of California.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a mortuary or crematory owe a duty of care to avoid causing emotional distress to close family members of a decedent whose remains are mishandled, even if those family members did not contract for the services, hold the statutory right of disposition, or witness the misconduct?
Opinions:
Majority - Baxter, J.
Yes, a duty of care is owed to a limited class of close family members. A provider of funeral-related services enters into a special relationship not just with the contracting party, but with the close family members for whose benefit the services are performed. This special relationship creates a duty to avoid causing emotional distress through negligent mishandling of the decedent's remains. The 'bystander' rule from cases like Thing v. La Chusa, which requires contemporaneous observation of the injury, does not apply because the plaintiffs here are direct victims of the breach of a duty owed to them, not merely witnesses to an injury to a third person. Limiting recovery to those who witness the misconduct would grant immunity for egregious, clandestine acts. However, this class of plaintiffs is limited to close family members who were aware the services were being performed to avoid limitless liability. Conversely, the plaintiffs cannot state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) because the defendants' outrageous conduct was not directed at the plaintiffs, nor did it occur in their presence with knowledge of a substantial certainty of causing them harm, which are requisite elements for IIED.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Mosk, J.
Yes, I agree that close family members may state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. However, the majority errs by denying a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The defendants' alleged conduct was so outrageous and reckless that they must have known it was highly probable to cause severe emotional distress to the decedents' loved ones. Requiring the defendants' conduct to be directed primarily at the plaintiffs, or that the plaintiffs be present, is an unrealistic and unjustified limitation in the context of corpse mutilation. It is paradoxical to hold defendants liable for their negligence but not for their more reprehensible intentional and reckless acts.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Kennard, J.
Yes, a duty exists, but the majority defines the eligible class of plaintiffs too broadly. Recovery for emotional distress from negligent mishandling should be limited to those who hold the statutory right to control the disposition of the remains and those immediate family members who actually observed the mishandling or its direct consequences. The majority's holding disregards this court's precedent limiting liability for intangible injuries to avoid creating limitless liability disproportionate to the defendant's fault. I also disagree with the majority's causation standard; instead of requiring plaintiffs to prove with 'substantial certainty' that their decedent was mistreated, the burden should shift to the defendants to prove the remains were not mishandled, once a plaintiff establishes a pattern of misconduct during the relevant time.
Analysis:
This decision carves out a significant exception to the general rule requiring sensory and contemporaneous observance for recovery in bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claims, as established in Thing v. La Chusa. By recognizing a 'special relationship' in the context of funeral services, the court creates a direct duty to non-contracting, non-percipient family members, thereby expanding liability for service providers in this unique context. However, by strictly rejecting the intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim, the court reinforces the high bar for that tort, requiring that the defendant's outrageous conduct be specifically directed at the plaintiff, rather than being generally reprehensible.
