Christensen v. Harris County
529 U.S. 576 (2000)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) does not prohibit a public employer from compelling its employees to use their accrued compensatory time off because the statute's silence on the matter does not constitute a prohibition.
Facts:
- A group of 127 deputy sheriffs were employed by Harris County, Texas.
- The deputy sheriffs individually agreed to accept compensatory time (comp time) in lieu of cash for overtime work, as permitted by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
- Over time, the deputies accumulated significant amounts of comp time.
- Harris County grew concerned about its financial liability for paying out large reserves of accrued comp time when employees left their jobs.
- To reduce this liability, Harris County implemented a policy that required employees to use their comp time when their accrued hours approached a set maximum.
- Under the policy, if an employee did not voluntarily schedule time off, a supervisor could order the employee to use their comp time at specific times.
Procedural Posture:
- A group of 127 deputy sheriffs sued Harris County and its sheriff in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging the county's compelled-use policy violated the FLSA.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for the petitioners (the sheriffs).
- The respondents (Harris County) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
- The Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment, holding that the FLSA did not prohibit the county's policy.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on this issue.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the Fair Labor Standards Act, which guarantees an employee's right to use accrued compensatory time upon request, prohibit a public employer from compelling its employees to use that time off in the absence of a pre-existing agreement?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Thomas
No. The Fair Labor Standards Act does not prohibit Harris County's policy of compelling employees to use their accrued compensatory time. Section 207(o)(5) of the FLSA is a minimal guarantee that an employee can use their compensatory time upon request, not the exclusive method by which comp time can be expended. The statute is silent on the issue of compelled use, and that silence does not create a prohibition. The Court rejected the petitioners' reliance on the 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius' canon, reasoning that the provision merely restricts an employer's ability to deny an employee's request, but does not address an employer's ability to compel use. Furthermore, because employers can lawfully order an employee not to work and can lawfully cash out accrued comp time, it would be illogical to prohibit the combination of these two actions. Finally, the Department of Labor's opinion letter advising against such policies is not entitled to Chevron deference because it is an informal interpretation and is only entitled to respect under Skidmore to the extent it is persuasive, which the Court found it was not.
Concurring - Justice Souter
I concur with the majority's opinion on the assumption that it does not prevent the Secretary of Labor from issuing formal regulations in the future that could limit an employer's ability to compel the use of compensatory time.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
I concur in the judgment. The Department of Labor's position should be analyzed under Chevron deference, not the anachronistic Skidmore standard, because it represents the authoritative view of the agency. However, I still join the majority's result because the agency's interpretation of the statute is unreasonable and therefore fails even under Chevron.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. The FLSA's provision for compensatory time is a limited exception to the general rule that overtime must be paid in cash, and this exception is only valid if an employer first reaches an agreement with its employees. Because the employer has no right to use comp time at all without an agreement, the terms of that use, including compelled use, must also be part of the agreement. The employer may not unilaterally impose a condition like forced-use that was not consented to. The majority mischaracterizes the issue by focusing on statutory silence rather than the prerequisite of an agreement for any use of the comp time exception.
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
Yes. The position of the Department of Labor, as an expert agency, is persuasive and merits respect under Skidmore v. Swift & Co. The Skidmore framework is not an anachronism and remains vital for analyzing agency interpretations that do not qualify for Chevron deference. The Labor Department's view that compelled use is only permissible if part of a prior agreement is eminently reasonable and should be followed.
Analysis:
This decision grants public employers significant flexibility in managing financial liabilities associated with accrued compensatory time by clarifying that the FLSA's silence on an issue does not create a prohibition. It establishes that the statute provides a floor for employee protections, not a ceiling that restricts employer prerogatives not explicitly mentioned. Legally, the case is also significant for its treatment of administrative deference; it reinforces the distinction between formal agency regulations deserving Chevron deference and informal interpretations like opinion letters, which are only entitled to Skidmore 'respect' based on their power to persuade. This holding limits the authority of informal agency guidance and requires courts to conduct their own, more searching analysis of the underlying statute.
Unlock the full brief for Christensen v. Harris County