No. Searching the whole house was illegal. The police can only search the person they arrest and the area immediately around them that they can easily reach (their 'wingspan'). This is allowed only to stop the person from grabbing a weapon or destroying evidence. Searching drawers in another room doesn't protect the officers, so they need a separate search warrant for that.

No, I agree with the main opinion that the search was illegal. My only worry is that this new rule will be tough for police departments in small towns across the country, who now have to get a lot more search warrants. But, it's more important to follow the Constitution correctly.

The search was fine. The police were already legally in the house to make the arrest and had a good reason to think stolen stuff was inside. If they had left to get a search warrant, Chimel's wife could have hidden or destroyed all the evidence. It was a reasonable and practical thing to do in that situation.

No, the police searching Chimel's whole house was not okay just because they were arresting him. They could only search him and the area close enough for him to reach a weapon or evidence. For searching more, they usually need special permission from a judge. The big search was unreasonable and went against Chimel's rights.

I agree with the Court, but it's tricky balancing people's rights with letting states enforce laws their own way. I don't feel right allowing searches that go against the Constitution. This case shows how much the law has changed how our country and this Court work.

The Court shouldn't change the old rule that let police search areas the arrested person controls if evidence might be there. It's unreasonable to make police leave to get permission if they already have good reason to search and worry evidence will disappear. The Court's new rule will stop searches that have good cause if not done right away. We have to balance privacy with the risk of losing evidence when police have reason to search.

No, searching Chimel's whole house was not permissible just because he was being arrested. Only he and the area within his immediate control could be searched without a warrant. For searching more, a warrant is usually required. The extensive search was unreasonable and violated Chimel's rights.

I agree with the Court that it is not okay for the police to search someone's whole house without permission from a judge after arresting them, but it's tricky balancing people's rights with letting states enforce laws their own way. I don't feel right allowing searches that go against the Constitution. This case shows how much the law has changed how our country and this Court work.

Yes, the police should be allowed to search areas the arrested person controls if evidence might be there. The Court shouldn't change the old rule that let police do so. It's unreasonable to make police leave to get permission if they already have good reason to search and worry evidence will disappear. The Court's new rule will stop searches that have good cause if not done right away. We have to balance privacy with the risk of losing evidence when police have reason to search.

The scope of a search incident to arrest is limited to the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control.

—we held that a search incident to arrest may only include "the arrestee's person and the area `within his immediate control'—construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. "

Searches incident to arrest are allowed because "it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape," and it is further reasonable "for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its …

The court emphasized that "There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs—or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself. Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a …

—a search incident to an arrest may not extend beyond the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control and from which he might gain possession of a weapon or something that could be used as evidence against him.

One exception to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on warrantless searches of a person's home is a search incident to arrest.

It is true that the Supreme Court, in articulating the search-incident exception, originally justified it as necessary to protect officer safety and to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence.

In describing the permissible scope of a warrantless search incident to arrest, the Court said: "Our reading of the cases suggests the generalization that articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within `the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or …

For example, the authority to search incident to arrest extends to "the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items [.]"

Yes. A warrantless search of an entire house incident to a lawful arrest violates the Fourth Amendment. The permissible scope of a search incident to arrest is limited to the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control.' This exception to the warrant requirement is justified by the need to disarm the suspect and preserve evidence, and its scope must be strictly tied to those justifications. A search of rooms beyond the arrestee's immediate reach is not justified by these concerns and is therefore unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment without a search warrant. To permit a broader search would be to allow general exploratory searches, akin to the general warrants the Amendment was enacted to prohibit, based on the mere fortuity of where an arrest occurs. This decision overrules United States v. Rabinowitz and Harris v. United States to the extent they are inconsistent with this principle.

Yes. Justice Harlan joined the majority, agreeing that Harris and Rabinowitz constituted 'bad Fourth Amendment law' that should be overruled. His sole hesitation stemmed from the practical implications of applying this new, stricter federal standard to state law enforcement agencies, which might be unprepared for the expanded warrant system now required. However, he concluded that the need to vindicate sound Fourth Amendment principles outweighed these federalism concerns.

No. A warrantless search of the premises where a lawful arrest occurs does not violate the Fourth Amendment when there is probable cause to search for evidence. The dissent argued that the majority's new rule is an unnecessary departure from established precedent. When police are lawfully on the premises to make an arrest and have probable cause to believe seizable items are present, the arrest itself creates an exigent circumstance. It is unreasonable to require officers to leave the scene to obtain a warrant, thereby risking the destruction or removal of evidence by accomplices or family members, such as Chimel's wife. The proper test is reasonableness, and a search of the premises under these circumstances is reasonable.

No, the search of Chimel's entire house was not justified as incident to his arrest because it went far beyond the petitioner's person and the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him. Absent well-recognized exceptions, the Fourth Amendment requires a search warrant for searches beyond this immediate area. The search here was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because there was no constitutional justification for extending the search beyond the area within Chimel's immediate control.

I join the Court's opinion, but note the dilemma faced in choosing between vindicating sound Fourth Amendment principles at the possible expense of state concerns or diluting the Federal Bill of Rights to leave States some elbow room in their criminal law enforcement methods. In good conscience, I cannot vote to perpetuate bad Fourth Amendment law. This case highlights the profound changes the "incorporation doctrine" has brought to our federal system and this Court's adjudicative processes.

The Court should not abandon the previously established rule allowing searches incident to arrest to extend to areas under the control of the defendant where items subject to constitutional seizure may be found. It is unreasonable to require police to leave the scene of an arrest to obtain a search warrant when they already have probable cause to search and there is a clear danger that evidence may be removed or destroyed. The majority's rule will prevent searches for which there is probable cause unless carried out immediately. Against the possible protection of privacy, the risk of destruction of evidence for which there is probable cause to search must be weighed.

No, the Fourth Amendment does not allow a warrantless search of an entire house as incident to a lawful arrest. The search of Chimel's entire house was not justified as incident to his arrest because it went far beyond the petitioner's person and the area from which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him. Absent well-recognized exceptions, the Fourth Amendment requires a search warrant for searches beyond this immediate area. The search here was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because there was no constitutional justification for extending the search beyond the area within Chimel's immediate control.

Yes, the Fourth Amendment allows a warrantless search of an entire house as incident to a lawful arrest. The Court should not abandon the previously established rule allowing searches incident to arrest to extend to areas under the control of the defendant where items subject to constitutional seizure may be found. It is unreasonable to require police to leave the scene of an arrest to obtain a search warrant when they already have probable cause to search and there is a clear danger that evidence may be removed or destroyed. The majority's rule will prevent searches for which there is probable cause unless carried out immediately. Against the possible protection of privacy, the risk of destruction of evidence for which there is probable cause to search must be weighed.

Chimel v. California

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