Chicago Teachers Union, Local v. Board of Education of the City
204 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3037, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13831, 797 F.3d 426 (2015)
Rule of Law:
A proposed class satisfies the commonality requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) where a uniform employment practice or set of criteria is applied by a centralized decision-making body to all class members, even if that process involves subjective discretion.
Facts:
- The Chicago Board of Education implemented a 'turnaround' policy to address deficient schools, a process that involved removing and replacing all administrators, faculty, and staff at selected locations.
- In 2011, the Board's CEO identified 226 schools eligible for turnaround based on probation status and then narrowed this list to 74 schools based on objective test score data.
- To select the final ten schools for turnaround, the CEO and a high-level committee conducted 'deep dives' involving subjective, qualitative review of factors such as leadership, school culture, safety, and facilities.
- The ten schools ultimately selected for turnaround in 2012 were located exclusively on the south and west sides of Chicago.
- Although African Americans comprised only 27% of the total teaching population in the system, they made up 51% of the tenured teachers displaced by these specific turnarounds.
- The Board terminated all teachers and staff at the ten selected schools on June 30, 2012.
- Displaced African-American teachers and the Chicago Teachers Union alleged that the selection of these specific schools was racially discriminatory.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs filed a class-action complaint against the Board of Education in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging racial discrimination.
- Plaintiffs moved for class certification under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) (for injunctive relief) and 23(b)(3) (for damages).
- The District Court denied the motion for class certification, ruling that the 'qualitative' and 'subjective' nature of the school selection process meant the plaintiffs failed to prove commonality.
- Plaintiffs appealed the denial of class certification to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a proposed class of employees satisfy the 'commonality' requirement for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) when the employer's decision to terminate them relied on a centralized committee applying subjective, qualitative criteria to select specific worksites for closure?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Rovner
Yes, the plaintiffs established commonality because the subjective decisions were made by a single high-level body using a uniform set of criteria applied to all schools. The District Court erred by misapplying the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes. In Wal-Mart, commonality failed because millions of employment decisions were delegated to thousands of local managers acting independently with total discretion. Conversely, in this case, the discretion was exercised by one distinct body (the CEO and Board) using one uniform process involving specific factors (e.g., academic trends, safety, leadership) to evaluate every school. The Court reasoned that subjective decision-making does not defeat class certification if the exercise of discretion is tied to a specific employment practice controlled by high-level directors. Furthermore, the Court noted that the initial objective steps of the selection process (filtering by test scores) might have independently caused a disparate impact, which constitutes a common issue regardless of the later subjective review. Consequently, the class certification requirements for both injunctive relief (Rule 23(b)(2)) and predominantly common questions (Rule 23(b)(3)) were met.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the application of Wal-Mart v. Dukes regarding class action certification in employment discrimination cases. It establishes that the presence of subjective or discretionary elements in a decision-making process does not automatically preclude class certification, provided the discretion is exercised centrally rather than dispersed among low-level supervisors. By distinguishing between 'bottom-up' discretion (as in Wal-Mart) and 'top-down' discretion (as in this case and McReynolds), the Seventh Circuit preserved the viability of disparate impact class actions challenging corporate-level policies. The ruling emphasizes that when a high-level committee uses a uniform analytical framework—even a qualitative one—to make decisions affecting a broad class, the 'commonality' requirement of Rule 23(a) is satisfied.
