Chew Heong v. United States
1884 U.S. LEXIS 1908, 5 S. Ct. 255, 112 U.S. 536 (1884)
Rule of Law:
A statute will not be construed to have a retrospective operation that divests previously vested rights, nor will it be interpreted in a way that conflicts with a prior treaty, unless Congress's intent to do so is expressed in clear and positive language. Courts must avoid statutory interpretations that lead to absurdity, injustice, or the impossibility of performance.
Facts:
- Chew Heong, a Chinese laborer and subject of the Emperor of China, resided in the United States on November 17, 1880.
- On that date, the United States and China concluded a treaty that allowed Chinese laborers then residing in the U.S. to 'go and come of their own free will and accord.'
- Chew Heong departed from the United States for Honolulu, in the Hawaiian Kingdom, on June 18, 1881.
- While he was abroad, Congress passed the Chinese Restriction Act of 1882 and an amendatory act in 1884.
- These acts established a system requiring a departing Chinese laborer to obtain a re-entry certificate from a customs collector as the sole permissible evidence of their right to return.
- Chew Heong returned to the port of San Francisco on September 22, 1884, on an American vessel.
- Upon arrival, he was denied permission to land because he did not possess the re-entry certificate, which he could not have obtained because he left the country before the law creating it was enacted.
Procedural Posture:
- Upon arriving in San Francisco and being denied entry, Chew Heong was detained on the vessel.
- A writ of habeas corpus was filed on his behalf in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California to challenge his detention.
- The U.S. Attorney for the district intervened on behalf of the United States, asking the court to deny the writ and order Chew Heong's removal from the country.
- The Circuit Court ruled against Chew Heong, holding that he was not entitled to re-enter the United States and must be deported.
- The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on a certificate of division in opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court.
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Issue:
Does the certificate requirement of the Chinese Restriction Act of 1882, as amended in 1884, which is the sole permissible evidence for re-entry, apply to a Chinese laborer who resided in the U.S. on the date of the 1880 treaty but departed before the 1882 Act was passed, thereby making it impossible for him to obtain such a certificate?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Harlan
No. The certificate requirement does not apply to a Chinese laborer who was protected by the 1880 treaty but left the country before the statutory certificate system was created, making it impossible for him to comply. Statutes must be interpreted, if possible, to avoid conflict with prior treaties and to prevent absurd or unjust results. The Court presumed Congress intended to faithfully execute the treaty, not abrogate it. To require a certificate that was physically impossible for Chew Heong to obtain would violate his vested right to return under the treaty and lead to a manifest injustice. The Court also applied the canon against retroactivity, refusing to apply the statute to divest a right that existed before the statute's enactment without a clear expression of Congressional intent to do so.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Field
Yes. The certificate requirement applies to all Chinese laborers seeking re-entry, and the act must be enforced according to its plain language. If an act of Congress conflicts with a prior treaty, the act, as the later expression of sovereign will, must control. The judiciary's role is not to question the wisdom or good faith of Congress. The 1884 amendment explicitly states the certificate 'shall be the only evidence permissible,' and the Court's creation of an unwritten exception frustrates this clear legislative intent, which was designed to prevent the widespread perjury that occurred when parol evidence of prior residence was allowed. Furthermore, the treaty right to 'go and come' likely only applied to laborers who maintained their U.S. residence and were temporarily absent, not those who, like Chew Heong, left for years.
Concurrence - Mr. Justice Bradley
Yes. Concurring with the dissent, the act requires a certificate in all cases. The language of the 1884 act, while perhaps containing an inadvertent 'nor' instead of 'and,' clearly shows a legislative intent to make the certificate the sole and mandatory proof of a right to re-enter. The statute's general tenor and specific provisions, such as the requirement for a certificate for land entry, support the conclusion that no exceptions were intended. Even if this construction causes the law to conflict with the treaty, it is a settled rule that a later act of Congress can overrule a treaty stipulation, and the Court is bound to enforce the law as written.
Analysis:
This case is a classic example of the use of canons of statutory construction to harmonize a domestic statute with international treaty obligations and constitutional principles of fairness. The majority's decision established a strong precedent for interpreting statutes to avoid abrogating rights vested under treaties unless Congress's intent is unmistakably clear. It highlights the tension between the 'last-in-time' rule (where a later statute can trump an earlier treaty) and the judicial presumption that Congress does not intend to violate international law or act unjustly. The case demonstrates the judiciary's role in protecting individual rights from the harsh application of a law, particularly where compliance is impossible, setting a framework for statutory interpretation that favors justice and honors international commitments over a rigid, literal reading of the text.
