Clem Perrin Marine Towing, Inc. v. Panama Canal Company

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
730 F.2d 186 (1984)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

Under principles derived from the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), a party to a contract who has reasonable grounds for insecurity regarding the other party's performance may, in writing, demand adequate assurance and, if commercially reasonable, suspend its own performance until such assurance is received.


Facts:

  • On March 15, 1974, Panama Canal Company (PCC) entered into a three-year 'Bareboat Charter Party' to lease a tugboat from Clem Perrin Marine Towing, Inc. (CPMT).
  • The agreement included an option for PCC to purchase the tug during the final 90 days of the lease, at which point CPMT was required to provide merchantable title.
  • The tug was encumbered by two mortgages at the time of the agreement, and CPMT later added a third.
  • In August 1976, PCC received information from a third party that CPMT was not making its payments on the tug's first mortgage.
  • On August 27, 1976, PCC wrote to CPMT demanding assurance that clear title would be perfected by the time the purchase option became exercisable.
  • In the same letter, PCC stated it would withhold the final lease payment, due September 15, 1976, until it received this assurance.
  • CPMT provided no response or assurance to PCC's demand.
  • On June 2, 1977, after mortgage holders threatened foreclosure, PCC purchased the outstanding mortgages on the tug for $111,897 to protect its interests.

Procedural Posture:

  • Clem Perrin Marine Towing, Inc. (CPMT) sued Panama Canal Company (PCC) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana for breach of contract after PCC withheld a payment.
  • PCC filed an answer and a counterclaim against CPMT, seeking damages for CPMT's prospective breach of its duty to provide merchantable title.
  • After extensive discovery and several denied summary judgment motions, the proceedings were stayed due to the bankruptcy of CPMT's owners and later CPMT itself.
  • After the stay was lifted, the district court (trial court) held a trial and entered a judgment in favor of CPMT.
  • The district court ordered PCC to return the tug, pay the final lease installment, and pay damages.
  • PCC, as the appellant, appealed the district court's judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, with CPMT as the appellee.

Locked

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Issue:

Does a party to a lease-purchase agreement, upon receiving information that creates reasonable grounds for insecurity about the other party's ability to convey merchantable title, have the right under U.C.C. § 2-609 principles to suspend its performance and demand adequate assurance?


Opinions:

Majority - Judge Higginbotham

Yes. A party with reasonable grounds for insecurity regarding the other party's ability to perform may suspend its own performance and demand assurance. The court held that the dispute was governed by U.C.C. § 2-609 principles, which have been incorporated into federal common law. PCC had reasonable grounds for insecurity after being informed by a reliable source that CPMT was failing to make mortgage payments, which jeopardized CPMT's ability to deliver merchantable title. The standard is one of 'reasonable insecurity,' not absolute certainty of non-performance. PCC's written demand for assurance was proper, and CPMT's subsequent silence made it commercially reasonable for PCC to suspend its final payment. Therefore, PCC's actions were justified, and it was CPMT that breached the contract by failing to provide assurance and being unable to deliver clear title.



Analysis:

This case establishes that the U.C.C. § 2-609 right to demand adequate assurance of performance is a key principle of federal common law applicable to government contracts. The decision empowers contracting parties to proactively manage risk based on credible information without waiting for an actual breach to occur. It clarifies that 'reasonable grounds for insecurity' is a flexible standard that does not require the insecure party to conduct an exhaustive investigation before acting. This ruling reinforces the idea that a party's failure to respond to a justified demand for assurance can itself constitute a breach, shifting liability to the silent party.

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