Yes, the appeals court was wrong. Forcing the Vice President to claim 'executive privilege' on every document is a huge burden and creates a big fight between the courts and the White House. The courts should have first looked at whether the request for documents was just too broad and invasive. This is especially true because this is a civil lawsuit, not a major criminal case like the one against President Nixon. The appeals court needs to reconsider this without making the VP play the 'executive privilege' card first.

No, the appeals court was right. The Vice President's team never asked the trial judge to simply make the document request smaller; they just said 'we won't give you anything at all.' They should have tried to work it out with the first judge before running to a higher court asking for a special, drastic order to stop everything.

Yes, the appeals court was wrong. The whole point of the lawsuit was to see if the watchdog groups had a right to the documents. Letting them demand all the documents to *prove* they have a right to them is a backwards way of doing things. The groups should have had to be much more specific from the very beginning.

Yes, the appeals court was very wrong. In fact, we should just order them to stop the discovery right now. It's obvious the watchdog groups didn't have a 'clear' right to the information—if they did, they wouldn't need to go on a massive fishing expedition to find it. Therefore, the Vice President's right to stop the fishing expedition is clear.

Yes, the higher court should have considered stepping in. The lower court's decision was wrong because it interfered with the President's team doing their job under the Constitution. Stopping a lower court like this is a big deal and only for really special situations. Here, the President's team showed they had no other way to fix the problem, they were clearly right, and it was the appropriate thing to do. The higher court made a mistake thinking the President's team had to say certain magic words first. They should have looked at the bigger picture of how this affected the President's important duties.

The lower court should have made the people suing show why they really needed each piece of information, since what they were asking for was such a big deal. We should try to avoid fights between the President and the courts if we can. Letting them get so much information right away was like deciding they were right before even finishing the case. The higher court that came up with the rule they used should figure out what to do next.

The lower court clearly went too far, and the higher court should have ordered them to stop the whole case. If the people suing need tons of information just to show they have a chance of winning, then this special fix from a higher court isn't the right thing to do. Just because they might win in the end doesn't mean they get this special treatment. That would let people use it for all kinds of cases.

The higher court was right to say no, because the President's team never even asked the lower court to limit what information they had to share. This special order isn't supposed to replace the normal way of appealing a case. The lower court didn't do anything wrong by waiting for the President's team to ask before limiting things. The higher court trusted that the lower court would keep things reasonable.

A petitioner seeking a writ of mandamus must show (1) that he has "no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires";(2) that his "right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable"; and (3) that "the writ is appropriate under the circumstances."

The writ of mandamus is "a drastic and extraordinary remedy reserved for really extraordinary causes."

To obtain mandamus relief, a petitioner must show, among other things, that "his right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable."

Third, even if the first two prerequisites have been met, the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.

Rather, the purpose of the "no other means" requirement as explained by the Supreme Court is to "ensure that the writ will not be used as a substitute for the regular appeals process."

However, " `only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion'will justify the invocation of the extraordinary remedy of mandamus. "

There, the plaintiff's filed civil suits directly against various government officials, including Vice President Cheney, alleging that the National Energy Policy Development Group ("NEPDG") was subject to disclosure requirements under federal law.

" `[O] ccasion [s] for constitutional confrontation between the two branches' should be avoided whenever possible. "

The special solicitude for a President seeking a writ of mandamus "give [s] recognition to the paramount necessity of protecting the Executive Branch from vexatious litigation that might distract it from the energetic performance of its constitutional duties."

Yes. A federal appellate court errs by requiring the assertion of executive privilege as a precondition for considering a writ of mandamus against discovery orders that implicate the separation of powers. The Court of Appeals' reliance on United States v. Nixon was misplaced because that case involved specific subpoenas in a criminal context, where the need for evidence is constitutionally weightier than in civil litigation. The discovery requests here are overly broad, and forcing the Executive to engage in a document-by-document privilege review is itself a burdensome intrusion on its constitutional functions that can provoke unnecessary inter-branch conflict. Courts must directly consider the separation of powers implications of the discovery itself and have the authority to narrow it before forcing a privilege claim.

No. The appellate court correctly denied the writ because the government failed to use other adequate means to obtain relief. The government's position in the District Court was an all-or-nothing demand for no discovery, and it never specifically asked the court to narrow the overly broad requests. Because the government bypassed the available remedy of having the District Court tailor discovery, its petition for the extraordinary remedy of mandamus based on overbreadth was premature and should have been denied.

Yes. The Court of Appeals should have vacated the discovery order because the underlying relief sought by the plaintiffs in the District Court was itself the extraordinary writ of mandamus. To obtain discovery to prove a right to mandamus relief essentially pre-judges the merits of the case. The District Court should have required the plaintiffs to make a strong initial showing that their specific, narrow requests would establish their claim, rather than placing the burden on the Executive to object to overly broad requests.

Yes. The appellate court not only erred, but it should have been ordered to issue the writ of mandamus immediately. The plaintiffs' need for wide-ranging discovery to even attempt to prove their case demonstrates that their right to relief was not 'clear and indisputable,' which is the standard for mandamus. Therefore, the government's right to be free from such burdensome and speculative discovery, and thus its right to the writ, was clear.

Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding it had no authority to issue the writ of mandamus on the ground that the Government could protect its rights by asserting executive privilege in the District Court. The discovery orders are an unwarranted impairment of the Executive Branch's duties under the Constitution. The writ of mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary remedy reserved for really extraordinary causes, and in this case, the Government has shown that its right to the issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable, with no other adequate means to attain relief, and that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances. The Court of Appeals labored under the mistaken assumption that the assertion of executive privilege is a necessary precondition to the Government's separation-of-powers objections. The Court of Appeals should have considered the separation-of-powers objections and whether the writ of mandamus was appropriate in light of the burdens imposed on the Executive Branch.

The District Court should have required respondents to demonstrate that particular discovery requests would tend to establish their case, given the extraordinary nature of the remedy they sought. Occasions for constitutional confrontation between the two branches should be avoided whenever possible. Granting broad discovery effectively prejudged the merits of respondents' claim for mandamus relief, which is inconsistent with the extraordinary nature of the writ. The Court of Appeals, as the architect of the de facto member doctrine, is the appropriate forum to direct future proceedings.

The District Court clearly exceeded its authority, and the Court of Appeals should have issued the writ of mandamus directing dismissal of the complaints. If respondents must conduct wide-ranging discovery to prove they have any right to relief, let alone a clear and indisputable right, mandamus is unwarranted. The mere possibility that the District Court might rule in respondents' favor cannot establish the clear right to relief necessary for mandamus. Otherwise, mandamus could turn into a freestanding cause of action to enforce virtually any statute.

The Court of Appeals correctly denied the writ of mandamus, as the Government never requested the District Court to narrow the scope of discovery. The purpose of the 'no other means' requirement is to ensure that the writ will not be used as a substitute for the regular appeals process. The District Court did not err in failing to narrow discovery on its own initiative, as it is not subject to criticism for awaiting a party's motion before doing so. The Court of Appeals expressed confidence that the District Court would keep discovery within appropriate limits.

Cheney v. United States District Court

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