Chemrock Corp. v. Tampa Electric Co.
36 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 318, 71 So.3d 786, 2011 Fla. LEXIS 1523 (2011)
Rule of Law:
Any document filed on the record, regardless of its substantive nature or intent to hasten the case to judgment, constitutes 'record activity' sufficient to prevent involuntary dismissal for lack of prosecution under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e), including during the sixty-day grace period after a notice of lack of prosecution.
Facts:
- In May 2002, Chemrock, a Delaware company that processes perlite, sued Tampa Electric Company in circuit court in Duval County.
- Chemrock's complaint alleged damages based on the claim that natural gas supplied by Tampa Electric was contaminated, causing damage to Chemrock’s furnaces.
- The case was initially set for trial in July 2003 but was continued indefinitely after the parties filed a joint motion for continuance.
- The order of continuance stated that the case would be reset for trial upon proper motion, but neither party subsequently filed a motion to have the case reset for trial.
Procedural Posture:
- Chemrock sued Tampa Electric in circuit court in Duval County (trial court).
- On December 27, 2006, Tampa Electric filed a notice of lack of prosecution under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e), alleging no record activity for the prior ten months.
- In February 2007, during the 60-day grace period, Chemrock filed a Motion in Opposition to Motion for Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution and Showing Good Cause Why Action Should Remain Pending.
- On June 24, 2008, Tampa Electric filed a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution.
- The trial court dismissed the case for lack of prosecution.
- Chemrock appealed the dismissal to the First District Court of Appeal.
- The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the action.
- The First District Court of Appeal certified that its decision was in direct conflict with decisions from the Second District Court of Appeal (Pagan v. Facilicorp, Inc. and Edwards v. City of St. Petersburg) and the Third District Court of Appeal (Padron v. Alonso).
- The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction to review the First District's decision due to the certified conflict.
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Issue:
Does any filing of record by a party during the sixty-day grace period after notice of lack of prosecution constitute 'record activity' sufficient to preclude dismissal under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e), regardless of whether the filing is intended to move the case toward a conclusion on the merits?
Opinions:
Majority - LABARGA, J.
Yes, any filing of record by a party during the sixty-day grace period after notice of lack of prosecution constitutes 'record activity' sufficient to preclude dismissal under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e), regardless of whether the filing is intended to move the case toward a conclusion on the merits. The Court clarified that its prior decision in Wilson v. Salomon, which established a bright-line test for 'record activity,' continues to apply to the current version of Rule 1.420(e), including the sixty-day grace period. The 2005 amendment to the rule, which shortened the initial inactivity period to ten months and added the grace period, was intended to alleviate the rule's harshness by providing notice, not to reintroduce subjective assessments of the quality of record activity. The Court explicitly receded from earlier precedent that required courts to determine if activity was 'active' or 'passive,' finding that such an approach created confusion and burdened litigants and trial courts. Therefore, a filing made during the grace period, such as Chemrock's Motion in Opposition, is sufficient to prevent dismissal for lack of prosecution.
Dissenting - QUINCE, J.
No, the rule was not intended to give plaintiffs multiple opportunities to simply sit on a case, and thus the technical compliance by Chemrock should not prevent dismissal. Although Chemrock's filing technically complied with the rule, the dissent argued that the rule's purpose was not to allow plaintiffs to delay indefinitely. This case marked the second time that lack of prosecution had been brought to the trial court's attention, and Chemrock had again allowed the case to remain inactive for an extended period after its procedural filing. The dissent believes such a pattern indicates the rule was not intended to apply in this situation, despite the technical satisfaction of the 'record activity' requirement.
Concurring - PARIENTE, J.
Yes, the majority's bright-line interpretation of what constitutes 'record activity' under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e) is correct, as it supports the balance of resolving cases on their merits while promoting judicial efficiency. The concurrence reiterated the dual policies of ensuring legitimate disputes are resolved on their merits and efficiently managing the court's docket. While acknowledging the case's long pendency, it emphasized that the primary concern is resolving cases on their merits. The concurrence further highlighted that timely case disposition is a joint responsibility of the parties and the court. It noted that once a plaintiff indicates readiness for trial (e.g., by filing a notice for trial), the court has a duty to set a trial date, and failure to do so often precludes dismissal for lack of prosecution. The opinion also suggested that judicial case management rules are more effective tools for ensuring timely progress than arbitrary application of Rule 1.420(e).
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the application of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e) by firmly establishing that any filing of record, regardless of its substantive nature, is sufficient to prevent dismissal for lack of prosecution. It reinforces the Florida Supreme Court's preference for a clear, easily applicable 'bright-line' rule over subjective judicial inquiry into the intent or quality of record activity, thereby reducing litigation over procedural definitions. While promoting judicial efficiency by simplifying the determination of record activity, this interpretation arguably shifts the burden more heavily onto the courts to actively manage their dockets to prevent languishing cases, rather than relying on dismissal for lack of prosecution as a primary tool. This approach prioritizes resolving cases on their merits, but it also necessitates vigilance from all parties to ensure at least minimal procedural filings during grace periods, even if those filings do not advance the case substantively.
