Charron v. Amaral
451 Mass. 767 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
A claim for loss of consortium requires a legal marital relationship between the injured party and the claimant at the time the cause of action accrues, and the Goodridge decision, which legalized same-sex marriage, does not apply retroactively to create such a relationship for events occurring before its effective date.
Facts:
- Cynthia Kalish and Michelle Charron met in 1986 and began dating monogamously in March 1990.
- In 1992, Kalish and Charron decided to live together, first in an apartment and later jointly purchased a house.
- In 1994, Kalish and Charron exchanged rings in a private ceremony.
- Kalish conceived a child through an anonymous donor program, who was born in 1998 and was jointly adopted by Kalish and Charron.
- The couple shared all household expenses, including for their child, and Charron obtained a family health insurance policy.
- In 1999, Kalish and Charron executed legal documents, including durable powers of attorney, wills, health care proxies, and life insurance policies, each naming the other as beneficiary or granting necessary legal authority.
- In December 2002, Charron sought treatment for a lump in her breast and was diagnosed with breast cancer in July 2003.
- At the time of Charron's diagnosis, Kalish and Charron were not legally married, but they applied for a marriage license on May 17, 2004 (the first day permitted after Goodridge), and were married on May 20, 2004.
Procedural Posture:
- Cynthia Kalish and Michelle Charron (plaintiffs) filed a medical malpractice action against the defendants in Massachusetts Superior Court.
- The defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment regarding Cynthia Kalish's claims for loss of consortium of Michelle Charron.
- The Superior Court judge allowed the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, concluding it was "required based upon the current state of the law."
- The Superior Court judge then reported the propriety of his ruling to the Appeals Court, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. R. 64(a).
- The Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case from the Appeals Court on its own initiative.
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Issue:
Does the Goodridge decision, which legalized same-sex marriage, apply retroactively to allow a same-sex spouse to pursue a claim for loss of consortium where the couple was not married when the personal injury cause of action accrued, but would have been if permitted by law and did marry after Goodridge?
Opinions:
Majority - Ireland, J.
No, the Goodridge decision does not apply retroactively to allow a same-sex spouse to pursue a claim for loss of consortium where the couple was not married when the personal injury cause of action accrued, even if they would have married if permitted by law and subsequently did marry after Goodridge. The court affirmed the long-standing principle that a claim for loss of consortium requires a legal marital relationship at the time the injury accrues, citing Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co. and Fitzsimmons v. Mini Coach of Boston, Inc. These precedents consistently rejected claims by cohabiting adults, even those in committed relationships, emphasizing the Commonwealth's "deep interest" in upholding the integrity of marriage and the need to limit tort liability. While acknowledging that Kalish and Charron could not have married before Goodridge, the court noted that Goodridge was expressly intended to apply prospectively, not retroactively. The Goodridge court stayed its judgment for 180 days precisely to give the Legislature time to conform existing statutes, indicating a prospective application. It did not declare that same-sex couples in committed relationships were already married or that benefits would be retroactively granted to compensate for past discrimination. Allowing such claims based on a "would have been married" standard would open numerous other areas of law to similar arguments, creating uncertainty and undermining the clarity of marital status, which is a prerequisite for a vast array of statutory benefits. Therefore, the court answered all reported questions in the negative and affirmed the grant of summary judgment.
Concurring - Marshall, C.J.
No, Goodridge does not authorize the court to confer marital rights retrospectively. Chief Justice Marshall agreed with the outcome but clarified the reasoning regarding Goodridge's application. She argued that Goodridge did not make its ruling "prospective" in the sense of a new rule applying only from the date of decision to prevent reliance issues. Instead, Goodridge merely delayed its implementation for 180 days to allow the Legislature to act, consistent with judicial deference to another branch of government, not because the change was "so radical." The Goodridge decision made civil marriage accessible to same-sex couples but did not alter the nature or legal definition of civil marriage itself, nor did it disturb the public policy favoring a clearly defined legal status for marriage. Granting nunc pro tunc (retroactive) recognition of a loss of consortium claim would effectively create a common-law or de facto quasi-marital status, blurring the carefully preserved bright line between civil marriage and other relationships. This would lead to increased litigation, require judges to selectively apply marital benefits, create private and public uncertainty about marital status, and undercut the Legislature's role in defining marriage.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the principle that, despite the landmark ruling in Goodridge legalizing same-sex marriage, the legal benefits and obligations of marriage, such as the right to claim loss of consortium, are strictly tied to the formal legal status of marriage at the time the cause of action accrues. It clarifies that Goodridge applies prospectively, emphasizing the judiciary's respect for a clear and unambiguous definition of civil marriage and the separation of powers in defining such status. This decision limits the retroactive reach of Goodridge, preventing a floodgate of litigation from individuals seeking to retroactively claim marital benefits based on "would have been married" arguments, thereby maintaining the "bright line" distinction between marriage and other committed relationships for legal purposes.
