Charles v. Diamond
41 N.Y. 318 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
A municipality's unreasonable and prolonged delay in providing adequate sewage services, which are mandated for property development, may constitute an unconstitutional application of an ordinance to a landowner's property, allowing for a declaration of unconstitutionality and alternative development, but generally does not entitle the landowner to money damages for a temporary taking without direct governmental displacement or intent for public acquisition.
Facts:
- Petitioner, a landowner in the Village of Camillus, planned to construct three apartment buildings (36 units) on his property.
- Village law required such buildings to be connected to the village sewage system.
- On May 9, 1972, the village board authorized the issuance of a building permit for petitioner's project.
- On May 22, 1972, the State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) informed petitioner that he could not connect to the village sewage system until the Village corrected deficiencies in its system, and directed the Onondaga County Health Department not to authorize connection.
- The Village of Camillus had long-standing sewage treatment problems, contributing to pollution of Nine Mile Creek, and had entered into a consent decree with the State Department of Health in 1966 for system improvements.
- In October 1972, the Village entered a new consent order with the State DEC, setting a timetable for specific remedial steps to address sewage plant issues and excessive infiltration into the collection system.
- In July 1973, the DEC found the Village was still discharging sewage and waste effluents into Nine Mile Creek that had not been subjected to effective primary treatment.
- In March 1976, the Village and the State entered into another consent order, acknowledging prior compliance issues and establishing a new schedule for construction of regional wastewater facilities to be completed and operational by January 1, 1980.
Procedural Posture:
- In June 1972, petitioner commenced an Article 78 proceeding in trial court (Special Term) against the State Commissioner of Environmental Conservation, the Deputy Commissioner of Onondaga County Department of Health, and the Village of Camillus, seeking approval for sewer connection, village action to allow connection, and damages.
- Special Term (trial court) dismissed the Article 78 proceeding for failure to state a cause of action.
- The Appellate Division (intermediate appellate court) reversed Special Term's dismissal (42 AD2d 232).
- On remand, Special Term (trial court) directed the Village to correct sewer deficiencies and the State to issue a permit upon village compliance, but dismissed the claim for money damages against all respondents.
- The Appellate Division (intermediate appellate court) modified Special Term's order, reinstating petitioner's cause of action for money damages for an alleged taking and directed an immediate trial on that claim (47 AD2d 426, 430).
- The Village of Camillus appealed this decision to the New York Court of Appeals (highest court).
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Issue:
Does a municipality's unreasonable and prolonged delay in remedying an inadequate sewage system, thereby preventing a landowner from developing property requiring connection to that system, constitute a compensable unconstitutional taking of property?
Opinions:
Majority - Jasen, J.
No, a municipality's unreasonable and prolonged delay in providing required sewer services, which effectively bars property development, does not automatically entitle a landowner to money damages as for a taking, unless there is actual governmental displacement of private ownership, occupation, or management, or the property is intended for public ownership, or government has already inflicted irreversible damage. The court held that while a municipality has the power to address sanitation problems, including imposing temporary restraints like moratoriums on building permits due to inadequate sewage systems, permanent interference with the reasonable use of private property is not permissible. An ordinance requiring connection to a public sewer, when the public sewer is inadequate and its improvement is unreasonably delayed, may be applied unconstitutionally, frustrating reasonable development. However, the proper remedy for an invalid police regulation, absent governmental displacement or intent for public acquisition of property, is a declaration of unconstitutionality, not monetary compensation as for an eminent domain taking. The court distinguished this case from situations involving direct governmental encroachment or de facto takings linked to an avowed taking statute, such as in Keystone Assoc. v State of New York. Extending tort liability for unconstitutional action without governmental trespass would have limitless implications, potentially deterring needed regulation and stripping municipal officers of discretionary power over public construction. Therefore, the court dismissed claims for money damages and directed the village to comply with existing State consent orders. It also allowed the landowner to seek a declaratory judgment that the sewer ordinance is unconstitutional as applied, which would free him to develop using private sewage disposal systems, provided they comply with local and state health requirements.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the limits of municipal police power regarding land use and development, particularly concerning essential public services. It distinguishes between a regulatory taking that warrants a declaration of unconstitutionality (allowing alternative development) and a de facto taking that merits monetary compensation, emphasizing the latter requires actual governmental physical intrusion or a clear intent to acquire the property. The ruling protects municipalities from open-ended financial liability for mere delays in public works, while still providing a remedy for landowners facing unreasonable burdens. It underscores the judiciary's reluctance to become involved in municipal fiscal and planning decisions through damage awards, reserving the primary role of review for unconstitutional actions to stopping the action itself or compelling compliance with legal directives.
