Charles v. . Barrett
1922 N.Y. LEXIS 847, 233 N.Y. 127, 135 N.E. 199 (1922)
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Rule of Law:
A general employer remains vicariously liable for the torts of an employee loaned to a special employer unless the general employer has surrendered complete command and control over the employee's performance of their duties; a mere division of command is insufficient to transfer liability.
Facts:
- Steinhauser, who was in the trucking business, supplied Adams Express Company with a motor van and a chauffeur.
- The agreement stipulated a rate of $2 an hour for the van and chauffeur.
- Adams Express Company was responsible for loading the van at its station and unloading it at its destination.
- Adams Express Company sealed the van at departure and unsealed it upon arrival.
- Between departure and destination, the chauffeur operated the truck without interference or supervision from Adams Express Company.
- While engaged in this work, the chauffeur struck and killed the plaintiff's son.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff sued the Adams Express Company in the trial court.
- The trial judge ruled as a matter of law that the Adams Express Company was liable.
- The defendant, Adams Express Company, appealed this decision to the Appellate Division, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's ruling and dismissed the complaint against the defendant.
- The plaintiff then appealed the Appellate Division's decision to the New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Is a company that hires a van and a driver from another business vicariously liable for the driver's negligence when it directs the driver on where and when to go, but does not control the manner in which the driver operates the vehicle?
Opinions:
Majority - Cardozo, J.
No. The company that hired the van and driver is not vicariously liable. The driver remained in the service of his general employer, Steinhauser, because there was no radical change of control that would relieve the general employer of liability. Although Adams Express Company, the special employer, directed where the driver should go, the duty of driving carefully remained a duty owed to the general employer, Steinhauser, who had entrusted the driver with the vehicle. The established rule is that as long as the employee is furthering the business of his general employer, there is no inference of a new employment relation unless command has been completely surrendered, and such surrender is not inferred from a mere division of command.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the 'borrowed servant' doctrine, establishing a strong presumption that the general employer retains liability for an employee's torts. The decision creates a critical distinction between control over the result of the work (e.g., the destination) and control over the manner and means of performance (e.g., how to drive). This precedent is fundamental in vicarious liability law, requiring courts in future cases to find a complete and radical transfer of control before shifting liability from a general to a special employer.
