Charles D. Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc.
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3910, 1997 A.M.C. 1521, 107 F.3d 331 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Jones Act, both the seaman-employee and the employer are held to a standard of ordinary prudence under the circumstances, not a reduced standard of 'slight care' for the seaman and a heightened standard for the employer.
Facts:
- Scurlock Marine, Inc. hired Charles Gautreaux, a licensed and experienced tanker man, as a relief captain for its vessel, the M/V BROOKE LYNN.
- The vessel was equipped with an electric towing winch on the port side that sometimes became 'bound up'.
- The permanent captain, Lance Orgeron, instructed Gautreaux on how to use a manual crank handle to unbind the winch motor, but did not warn him to remove the handle before re-engaging the electric power.
- Approximately four months into his employment, the port side winch became taut and bound up while Gautreaux was on duty.
- Gautreaux attempted to free the winch by attaching the manual crank handle to the motor.
- While turning the crank, Gautreaux simultaneously pressed the electric ignition switch to engage the winch.
- When the winch motor engaged, it violently threw the crank handle off the motor, striking Gautreaux in the face and causing severe injuries, including the crushing of his right eye.
Procedural Posture:
- Charles Gautreaux sued Scurlock Marine, Inc. in U.S. District Court for negligence under the Jones Act.
- The jury, instructed that a seaman need only exercise 'slight care' for his own safety, returned a verdict for Gautreaux, finding Scurlock Marine 95% at fault and Gautreaux 5% at fault.
- The district court entered judgment on the verdict, later amending it after Gautreaux accepted a remittitur.
- Scurlock Marine, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing the 'slight care' jury instruction was erroneous.
- A three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding it was bound by circuit precedent establishing the 'slight care' standard.
- The Fifth Circuit granted a petition for rehearing en banc to reconsider the standard of care for seamen under the Jones Act.
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Issue:
Does the Jones Act hold a seaman to a duty of only 'slight care' for their own safety in a contributory negligence analysis, or to the standard of an ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances?
Opinions:
Majority - Duhé, Circuit Judge
No. The Jones Act holds a seaman to the standard of an ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances, not a duty of only slight care. The court traced the origin of the 'slight care' standard in the circuit's precedent and concluded it was based on a misinterpretation of Supreme Court cases. The term 'slightest' in FELA and Jones Act jurisprudence properly modifies the causation standard for the employer's negligence (i.e., the employer's negligence need only play the 'slightest' part in causing the injury), not the standard of care owed by either party. The court held that the text of the governing statute, the FELA, provides no basis for applying different standards of care to the employer and employee. Therefore, the long-standing precedent applying a 'slight care' standard for seamen and a heightened standard for employers is overruled in favor of a uniform standard of ordinary prudence for both.
Analysis:
This en banc decision significantly realigns Jones Act negligence law within the Fifth Circuit, abolishing the seaman-friendly 'slight care' standard for contributory negligence. By establishing a uniform standard of 'ordinary prudence' for both employers and employees, the court makes it easier for employers to establish a seaman's comparative fault, potentially reducing damage awards. The decision brings the circuit's jurisprudence in line with other federal circuits and grounds the standard of care in traditional common-law negligence principles, correcting a decades-long misapplication of the causation standard.
