Chapman v. United States
1961 U.S. LEXIS 1396, 365 U.S. 610, 5 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1961)
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Rule of Law:
A landlord does not have the authority to consent to a warrantless police search of a tenant's rented premises, and evidence obtained from such a search is inadmissible in federal court.
Facts:
- One Bridgaman owned a dwelling house which he rented to petitioner Chapman.
- On February 16, 1958, Bridgaman went to the house and, upon arrival, noted a strong odor of mash.
- Unable to get a response or see inside, Bridgaman contacted the local police.
- Bridgaman and two police officers returned to the house, where they all smelled the strong odor of whiskey mash.
- Finding all but one bathroom window locked, Bridgaman gave the officers his permission to enter the house through the unlocked window.
- An officer entered the home and discovered a complete distillery and 1,300 gallons of mash in the living room.
- Shortly thereafter, Chapman arrived at the house, entered with his key, and was arrested by the officer inside.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioner Chapman was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia for violations of federal liquor laws.
- Chapman filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his rented house, arguing it was obtained through an unlawful search.
- The District Court denied the motion to suppress.
- At trial, the evidence was admitted over Chapman's objections, and a jury found him guilty.
- Chapman appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment and the conviction.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
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Issue:
Does a warrantless search of a tenant's rented home, based solely on the landlord's consent, violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Whittaker
Yes, a warrantless search of a tenant's home based on the landlord's consent violates the Fourth Amendment. A landlord lacks the authority to waive a tenant's constitutional right to privacy and security against unreasonable searches. The Court rejected the government's arguments that the landlord had a right to enter to 'view waste' or that the tenant's illegal activity forfeited his tenancy rights, holding that such common law property distinctions should not be imported into Fourth Amendment analysis. Citing Johnson v. United States, the Court emphasized that inferences of probable cause must be drawn by a 'neutral and detached magistrate,' not by police officers, and that the inconvenience of obtaining a warrant is not an excuse to bypass this constitutional requirement. The search was not incident to a lawful arrest and no exigent circumstances existed to justify the officers' failure to obtain a warrant.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Clark
No, the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was reasonable under the circumstances. Under Georgia law, a tenant's use of the premises for the illegal manufacture of liquor works a forfeiture of their lease rights at the landlord's option. When the landlord, Bridgaman, discovered the illegal activity and directed the officers to enter, he was exercising his option to forfeit the lease, making Chapman a trespasser. Therefore, Bridgaman was merely repossessing his own property and had the authority to permit entry. The officers reasonably relied on the owner's direction, making the search valid.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Frankfurter
Yes, the search was unconstitutional, but not for the reasons stated by the majority. The majority's reasoning implicitly relies on the overruled precedent of Trupiano v. United States. It would have been reasonable for a police officer to believe a landlord could authorize entry. However, the search is still unconstitutional based on a broader historical understanding of the Fourth Amendment, which dictates that warrantless searches of private dwellings are per se unreasonable, barring very few specific exceptions not present here. The judgment of reversal is correct, but it should be based on the fundamental principle that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for searches of homes, rather than on the nuances of landlord-tenant law.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies a tenant's Fourth Amendment protection against warrantless searches, establishing that a landlord cannot waive this right on the tenant's behalf. It clarifies that a tenant's possessory interest and legitimate expectation of privacy in a rented dwelling are paramount to the landlord's ownership interest for search and seizure purposes. By refusing to import 'subtle distinctions' from property law into constitutional analysis, the Court simplified the Fourth Amendment inquiry, focusing it on privacy rights rather than property rights. This case serves as a key precedent limiting the scope of third-party consent, impacting how law enforcement must approach searches of rented properties, hotels, and other temporarily occupied spaces.
